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ABSTRACT:  This article examines the role of the corporate vehicle in the creation of 
social costs.  The article identifies some of the political commitments and philosophies 
behind the differing notions of corporations.  Social costs are those activities which result 
from business activity and cause uncompensated harm to society.  The founding 
contribution to the law and economics discussion by Ronald Coase is given a thorough 
treatment.  The paper next, turns to the dominant explanation of corporate structure, 
namely the law and economics model developed expounded by Easterbrook and Fischel.  
It then applies the theoretical discussion in a case study of the world’s largest 
corporation, WAL-MART, Inc.  It next examines the relation of social costs and corporate 




Social costs of business activity have been a concern of economists, politicians, lawyers, 
business people and society at large for decades.  Through the passage of time, our 
awareness of the nature, extent or dimensions, and incremental and accumulating impact 
of social costs has increased dramatically.  Various approaches to the problem have been 
suggested from governmental regulation, to cessation of activities, to free markets.   
 
Regardless of one’s underlying commitments, it cannot be denied that with respect to the 
most significant social cost—the threatened habitability of the planet—the current 
approaches are failing.1 Yet despite our knowledge of the impending disaster and its 
causes, to date there has been very limited success in coordinating efforts address it.2
From this failure, it may be argued that indeed there may be other social costs which have 
yet to be clearly identified which are, nevertheless, accumulating and possibly with 
significant consequences.   
 
1 UNEP Climate Change makes it clear that there is indeed a climate change problem caused by human 
activities and that the consequences could be drastic.   http://climatechange.unep.net/ 
2 The most recent failure of coordination has been the failure of the United States of America and Australia 
to sign the Convention and Kyoto Protocol.  See latest information on this matter at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/convkp.html For a discussion of the problem as a coordination problem, see 
Katharina Holzinger, “Aggregation Technology of Common Goods and its Strategic Consequences: Global 
Warming, Biodiversity and Siting Conflicts,” 1  EUROPEAN J. OF POLITICAL RESEARCH 40 (2001).. 
Ecological economists has been making an effort to do address environmental problems resulting from 
perspectives promoted by their discipline.  For a helpful introduction to ecological economics and its 
relation to law, see Douglas Kysar, “Sustainability, Distribution and the Macroecnomic Analysis of Law,” 
43 B.C.L. REV. 1 (2001). 
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This study considers some of these social costs which at present are only poorly 
identified and not much studied.  Social costs are the negative by-products of commercial 
activity not paid for by the beneficiaries of the activity.  Instead, these negative by-
products or “costs” are borne by the rest of society—hence, “social costs.” They are the 
costs to others or society at large of the conduct of business.  As will be discussed, social 
costs often involve coordination problems—problems that can only be solved by people 
coordinating their efforts rather than simply acting as individuals seeking their own 
interests.  Obviously, the previously mentioned matter of climate change is one such 
matter.  Another less obvious one arises from business activity, and particularly through 
the corporate vehicle.   
 
In considering corporations in society, one must have an idea of the nature of the 
corporation, ideas about the nature of society, and the role of law, business, people and 
corporations in the composition and functioning of society.  From a corporate law 
perspective, one needs to consider who counts as a member of the corporation: whether it 
be shareholders, directors, managers, employees and other suppliers, or possibly even 
including society at large. Corporate law must consider the coordination of all of these 
elements of society and the costs imposed on society. The focus of this article is the 
social cost—i.e. the cost to the people who make up society—of the activity of large 
corporations.  In order to create an informed context for the discussion, all of these issues 
will have to be addressed.   
 
To avoid creating an argument based on mere speculation about social costs and 
corporations, the second part of this study will be a case study of Wal-Mart.  The study 
will attempt to answer the question: Are there significant social costs which are poorly 
identified and not well studied associated with large corporations?  This question is 
becoming increasingly important as a consequence of globalization, which is driven 
largely by corporations and which has significantly increased corporate power.  
Multinational corporations and their investors have been implicated in the inhumane and 
devastating policies known as Structural Adjustment Programs promoted by the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the manifestly unfair trade policies of the 
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World Trade Organization.3 The great power of these corporations is not being used for 
the betterment of society,4 and so it is incumbent upon scholars to study and consider 
carefully the activities of these members of society. 
 
This study will examine critically theories of the corporation, then the views and theories 
of Ronald Coase, a leading economist and thinker on social costs.  Next, it will turn to a 
critical review of law and economics analysis of corporate law.  This law and economics 
perspective will be used since its descriptive power, particularly in corporate law, is 
widely accepted.5 In order to understand the law and economics perspective, it will be 
necessary to analyse its presuppositions, and then see how these approaches produce 
outcomes consistent with their presuppositions. Finally, it will apply this critical analysis 
to the activities of the specific business that serves as the case study, Wal-Mart, by 
identifying the social costs, and determine what, if any, relation there is between these 
social costs and the corporate vehicle-corporate law. 
 
The study has identified a number of poorly considered social costs created by Wal-Mart.   
Furthermore, for various reasons, it will be shown that these social costs tend to fall 
outside of the traditional law and economics paradigm, and so fail to be considered as 
matters of corporate law.  Finally, the study will conclude with some suggestions for both 
further law reform and directions for future study.   
 
3 JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002) is a thorough-going and stinging 
indictment of the IMF and to a lesser degree of the World Bank, of which Stiglitz himself served as chief 
economist.    Stiglitz comments are mostly restricted to the investors.  The investors, however, are those 
who invest on behalf of corporations in hedge funds, futures and options to limit the exposure of their 
corporate sponsors.  STIGLITZ 128-130, and NOAM CHOMSKY, PROFIT OVER PEOPLE: NEOLIBERALISM AND 
GLOBAL ORDER, (1999) discusses the collusion if not control exercised by international financial interests 
and multinational corporations over the IMF and World Bank as part of the Washington Consensus, 19-20.  
Further he discusses the WTO as charged with the task of exporting American values. 65-72. 
4 Much of Chomsky’s work is a sweeping review and analysis of the involvement of corporations in the 
political system of the United States of America.  Chomsky shows how the corporations have corrupted 
government and subverted democratic processes to serve their own interests.  See for example, 38-39, 61 
and the trend he refers to as the “corporatization of America.” 132.  See as an other example, the role of 
MNC’s in thwarting private enterprise in Singapore, in Tan Yock Lin, Legal Change and Commercial Law 
in Singapore, in EAST ASIA—HUMAN RIGHTS, NATION – BUILDING, TRADE, (1999) ALICE TAY, ED., 29. 
5 Gary Minda, “The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980’s” 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 599 (1989) 
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The study is limited to the discussion of a single case.  Because of the innovative nature 
of the study, there is limited data available for broader study.  In addition, at this stage in 
the research, it is the author’s opinion that a deeper study, identifying more specifically, 
and identifying a higher quantity social costs is more important or helpful than a broader 
more general discussion.  Accordingly, the generalizations which can be made from this 
study are limited.  It does not purport to be suitable to all jurisdictions, nor to all 
corporate models, nor to all industries.  It is the study of a specific multinational retail 
sales corporation, which happens to be the largest corporation in the world.6
2) HOW TO READ THIS ARTICLE: DIMENSIONS OF THE DISCUSSION 
 
At the outset, I believe it is necessary to identify the main belief sets forming the 
backdrop for this discussion.  In his fascinating and comprehensive analysis of academic 
legal debate, Professor Gerald Wetlaufer observes that, “conversations and arguments are 
less easily understood, less easily learned, less productive, less conclusive, and 
sometimes less civil than we might think it reasonable to expect.”7 He comments, “We 
hear a great many arguments in which it seems that people ought to be convincing one 
another but, in fact, are not. We see arguments that fail to persuade, disagreements that 
never end, and, all too often, partisans who neither understand nor respect their 
adversary's positions.”8 Few of those engaged in the dialogue would disagree with this 
comment; hence, his analysis of the underlying philosophical commitments which are the 
cause of this inability to communicate within the academic legal community are worth 
identifying, for improving an understanding of the intractability of the advocates of the 
various positions presented in this article.  
 
Wetlaufer identifies a “Master Paradigm” in which most legal dialogue is conducted.  
That paradigm is liberalism—views of individualism, autonomy, freedom, and that the 
 
6 Details discussed in detail in Part 6. 
7 G. Wetlaufer, “Systems Of Belief In Modern American Law: A View From Century's End” 49 AM. U.L. 
REV. 1 2 (1999) 
8 Id, at 2. 
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role of the state is the protection of the individual and those freedoms.  This view 
includes commitments to:  rights discourse, a particular version of rule of Law, notion 
that public and private spheres are distinguishable realities, and that state action is 
appropriate only in the public sphere.9 Any discussion which does not bow to these 
primary commitments is simply dismissed. Within this larger paradigm, there are two 
main schools of thought that have relevance to this discussion.  They are the Legal 
Realists and their most important successors, the Law and Economics scholars, and the 
Legal Positivists.  Whereas the Legal Realists see law as nothing more than the 
conventions of a society, changeable, measurable, instrumental in achieving specified 
objectives, having no particular commitment to method, the Legal Positivists see law as 
an objective, independent first principle.  More contentiously, at least in the strong 
version, the Legal Realist Law and Economics scholars see all value and morals as 
nothing more than the cash amount a person is willing and able to pay.10 Furthermore, 
Law and Economics, at least the neo-classicist scholars view justice as the mere 
maximization of aggregate wealth.11 Any notion of redistribution or movement of costs 
other than as placed by the market is inefficient diminution of wealth maximization.12 
Legal Positivists, by way of contrast, view law as an independent endeavour, an 
independent discipline with its own set of norms, methods of analysis and values.  Legal 
Positivism carries with it commitments to philosophical positivism, utilitarianism, and 
classical liberalism.13 As well, it holds to notions of justice as fairness, Aristotelian 
notions of corrective and distributive justice, and practical reason.14 It sees moral 
knowledge as both possible and objective.   
 
The law and economics scholars clearly belong to the Legal Realist tradition and clash 
with the Legal Postivists.  Before coming to any conclusion concerning the matters 
 
9 Id, at 9. 
10 Posner, cited in Wetlaufer, supra n. 7 41 n. 144.  For criticism of Posner’s views on this matter, see 
Whitney Cunningham, “Testing Posner’s Strong Theory of Wealth Maximization” 81 GEO. L. R. 141. 
(1992) 
11 Id, at 38. 
12 Wetlaufer, supra n. 7 38. 
13 Id, at 46. 
14 Id, at 47.  
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discussed in this article, it is important to consider the validities of each frame of 
reference, regardless of which set of a prioi commitments one finds oneself drawn to.  As 
is most often the case in such debates, neither has a corner on the truth and so it behoves 
all disputants to consider the contribution of the other.  
 
Wetlaufer proceeds to identify ten dimensions of prior commitments which set the legal 
debate into different directions.  These dimensions are: 
 
(1) the fairness and legitimacy of the existing order; 
(2) prime values and projects (e.g. law is to: facilitate wealth maximization, creation 
of a just society, or ensure order); 
(3) focus and center of attention; 
(4) human nature and social existence; 
(5) the nature and consequences of language; 
(6) the nature of knowledge and the possibilities of reason and objectivity; 
(7) the relationship between law and other disciplines; 
(8) interpretive strategies and forms of argument; 
(9) the possibility of the rule of law; and 
(10) the consequences of speaking against either of the above.15 
One’s various commitments along the above ten dimensions primarily determines what 
one finds, and what one finds acceptable among various possible outcomes.  
 
a) Ten Dimensions and the Law and Economics Discussion 
Among the commitments Wetlaufer discusses, we can identify the following dimensions 
as critical to this discussion: (1) the fairness and legitimacy of the existing order; (2) 
prime values and projects; (3) focus and center of attention; and (4) human nature and 
 
15 Id, at 60 
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social existence. As will be discussed in more depth later in this article—concerning the 
value assumptions of the law and economics movement—the law and economics 
discussion is decidedly in favour of the status quo, see efficiency and wealth 
maximization as the prime value and project, is focused on individual wealth and rights, 
and denies the existence of any such thing as society.  As a discipline, law and 
economics’ commitment to neo-classical economics, incorporates by default the 
assumptions of neo-classical economics.16 One of the hallmarks of neo-classical 
economics is its commitment to radical individualism.  Individuals are the only legitimate 
subject of study as society is noting more than a collection of individuals.17 
16 Charles Pouncy, “Economic Justice and Economic Theory: Limiting the Reach of Neoclassical Ideology”
14 J. LAW & PUB. POL’Y 11 (2002), See also Cunningham, supra n. 10.  See Daniel Hausman, The inexact 
and separate discipline of economics, (1996). 
17 Pouncy id. 
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3) CORPORATIONS  
 
To understand the corporation, its role in society and the problem associated with 
controlling its social costs, there needs to be a brief discussion of the nature of the 
corporation and corporate theory.  The nature of the corporation can be explained by a 
review of some of its historical developments, and a brief examination of some of its 
models.18 
In its early form, the joint-stockholder corporation would have passed liability for social 
costs onto the shareholders.  This potential passing of liability to shareholders may have 
had a significant impact on corporate behaviour and subsequent corporate development if 
tort law had been more mature and social costs more clearly identified.  Interestingly, it 
should not be supposed that social costs were invisible.  Indeed there were high rates of 
worker injury and death; the courts, however, placed no liability on the corporate owners 
for such injury.19 Society had to bear these costs for the benefit of industrialization, which 
benefit was a benefit primarily to the entitled classes. As a theory popular in the late 19th 
and early to mid-20th century, the main social costs identified were smoke and other 
visible industrial atmospheric discharges which the law deals with as a matter of mere 
nuisances between neighbours.20 
18 The issues of corporations and corporate models are discussed in Benedict Sheehy, “Scrooge  – The 
Reluctant Stakeholder: Theoretical Problems in The Shareholder-Stakeholder Debate.” Forthcoming: 12 U. 
OF MIAMI BUS. L. R. (2004)  and Benedict Sheehy, “The Importance of Corporate Models: Economic And 
Jurisprudential Values And The Future Of Corporate Law.” 2(3) DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L. J. (2004) 
(Forthcoming).  For a masterful analysis of the history of corporate models and a critical consideration of 
the claims to innovative insights made by neo-classical corporate law and economics study see William 
Bratton, “The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History,” 1 STANFORD LAW 
REV. 1471-527 (1989), in THE LAW OF THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: SELECTED ESSAYS, SALLY WHEELER 
ED., OXFORD READINGS IN SOCIO-LEGAL STUDIES (1994) 117-179. 
19 Hutchinson v. York Newcastle Rly (185) 5 Exch. 343 
20 See cases cited by Coase “"The Problem of Social Costs," 1 J. OF LAW AND ECON., 1
(1960).  This view of atmospheric pollution is still evident in international atmospheric 
litigation such as between the USA and Canada concerning acid rain, and other 
contaminants.  United States vs. Canada, Arbitral Tribunal, Montreal 16 April 1938 and 11 
March 1941; United Nations Reports of International Arbitral Awards 3 (1947) 1905; 
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 33 (1939) 182, and 35 (1941) 716.  The issue 
of externalities, coordination and economic analysis in a transboundary problem is given an 
in depth treatment in Franz Xavier Perrez “The Efficiency Of Cooperation: A Functional 
Analysis Of Sovereignty,” 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 515. 527-42 (1998)   
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a) Concession Theories 
Concession theorists note that the corporation owes its existence to a governmental 
concession.  In the beginning, governments delegated and granted trading rights to 
corporations.21 Corporations were permitted to carry on only those activities authorized 
in the concession granted by the government.  The limits of the concession were set out 
in the articles of incorporation or constitution of the corporation.  Given this 
concessionary nature of the corporation, the government retained certain rights 
concerning the governance and operation of the corporation.  22 
The roots of this view are in the corporation’s history.  In the concessionaire view, the 
corporation is an entity different and separate from the shareholder/ investors. It is often 
referred to as the legal fiction or corporate personality theory.  In its essence, this model 
focuses on such characteristics as the corporation’s legal identity, independent of the 
parties involved in either management, investors, or employees.  It also highlights the 
corporation’s legal rights and responsibilities as a legal person who can sue in its own 
right and be sued, pay taxes, and otherwise subject, independently of its members, to the 
laws of society.23 In this view, the corporation is a concession granted by the government 
to a group of would be investors.24 As a concession from the government, the 
corporation continues to be subject to the government’s will. If one accepts a 
concessionaire view of the corporation, it is easier to see the argument for stakeholder 
involvement or at least for government regulation such as limiting social costs such as 
 
21 JANET DINE, THE GOVERNANCE OF CORPORATE GROUPS, (2001), 21 
22 An interesting, peculiarly Australian view which may be viewed as an offshoot of the conscessionaire 
theory is “constitutionalism.”  As argued by Australian corporate law scholar, Stephen Bottomley, 
“[corporations] themselves are systems in which power and authority, rights and obligations, duties and 
expectation, benefits and disadvantages, are allocated and exercised….  Each company is a body politic…” 
Stephen Bottomley, “From Contractualism to Constitutionalism: A Framework for Corporate 
Governance” 19 SYDNEY L. REV. 277.  Dine observes that the concessionaire view is susceptible to the 
criticism that the corporation is no more than a mere fiction.  If it is not made up of the solid, physical 
shareholders, acting in concert to create a common enterprise, the corporation has no more substance than a 
mere idea.  Further, while it may explain the foundation of the corporation, concession theory fails as an 
operational theory.  It does not explain by whom or how the corporation is to be run.  Nor yet does it set 
any limits on state involvement.  Indeed a pure concession view allows the corporation to be a mere 
instrument of the state.  Dine, id, 24. 
23 David Millon, "Theories of the Corporation," DUKE L.J. 201(1990). 
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green house gas emissions permitted to a particular corporate entity.  As a governmental 
concession, the corporation owes duties back to the government.  This obligation, 
however, does not extend automatically, beyond government into a general duty to 
society.25 The concessionaire model of the corporation in the historical context allows 
social costs as unfortunate consequences to be borne by society for the benefit of the 
investor.   
 
i) Political entity 
In a variation of the concession theory, some corporate theorists focus on the 
corporation’s political character. Its political characteristics are its constitutional 
foundation setting up internal control structures similar to governments, its power, its 
decision making processes, the need for managers to balance competing interests, and 
such broader concerns as implied by the Corporate Governance movement.  Some 
scholars draw in further political implications from this model such as the democratic 
principle that those effected by decisions should have voice.   
 
Social costs in this model are viewed much as social costs in all political decision 
making.  They are part of the society.  The issue in corporate law, of course, is who 
makes this “corporation’s society”?  Is it investors and directors only, or does it include 
employees and other suppliers, or society at large.  Perhaps the most important benefit of 
the model is the acknowledgement of the corporation as a powerful, political entity. 
Although currently out of fashion because of its connection to the concession theory, 26 it 
may yet have some life.27 
ii) Communitarian  
 
24 Gregory Mark, "Some Observations on Writing the Legal History of the Corporation in the Age of 
Theory," in LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL (ED.), PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 67, 68-69 (1995). 
25 DINE, supra n. 21,  at 21 
26 Jennifer Hill, “Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder,” 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 39 56 (2000). 
27 See, for example, ANDREW FRASER, REINVENTING ARISTOCRACY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMATION 
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, (1998). 
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These views—concessionaire and political views—are subsumed in the communitarian 
model of the corporation.28 Communitarians argue that the corporation is a community, 
political entity, granted a separate identity by the government, participating in society at 
large with its own independent rights, privileges, duties and obligations.  Accordingly, it 
should be responsible for its social costs, just as every other rights bearer in society. 
 
b) Contractarian Theories29 
Contractarians view the corporation as a form of contract between its members.  This 
theory posits the corporation as a private matter between individuals and accordingly, 
places no additional duty on the corporation than that which exists on each, separate 
individual involved in the corporation.  The corporation, as nothing more than a 
collection of individuals, is a private matter and as such should be subject to the least 
possible government interference. 
 
The roots of this theory go back historically to an era when the characteristics of the 
modern corporation—particularly, limited liability—had not been created.  This model of 
the corporation comes from corporate origins as the joint-stockholder company.  In that 
model, the corporation is simply another partnership-like arrangement in which the 
shareholders are essentially owners, liable for the debts of the company.30 The corporate 
vehicle is a convenient private financial arrangement,31 which allows entrepreneurs to 
invest jointly in enterprises too large or too risky to undertake on a single investor basis.  
This model is often called the aggregate model and in it, the directors are the agents of 
their principals, the shareholders. It is discussed primarily as the aggregate model, 
meaning that the corporation is nothing more than the aggregate of the individual 
members. 
 
28 LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL ED., PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (1995). 
29 There are other approaches to the analysis of corporations as voluntary collectives.  See 
for example Paula J. Dalley “To Whom It May Concern: Fiduciary Duties And Business 
Associations” 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 515 45 (2001). 
30 See, for example, Margaret Jane Radin, "The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality," 32 COLUM. L. 
REV. 643 (1972). 
31 See Morton Horwitz, "Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory," 88 W. VA. L. REV.
173, 204 (1985); D. Gordon Smith, "The Shareholder Primacy Norm," 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 302-03 (1998). 
The aggregate theory of the corporation was seen as hostile to both state regulation and to the burgeoning 
management corporation. See Bratton, supra n. 18, at 1471, 1489. 
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The economic contractarian model, as distinguished from the legal contractarian model 
traces its origins at least as far back as the economist Ronald Coase.32 Coase first 
proposed that the corporation is a type of firm.33 By describing the corporation as a firm, 
Coase means that this type of organization operates as a more efficient means of 
production than the market, and it does this, he claims, by grouping people and inputs 
together, combining tasks in one enterprise and thereby lowering transaction costs.34 In 
this model, there is a direct connection and related accountability between the contracting 
parties: the capital provider-shareholders and the managers.  As economist Milton 
Friedman has famously put it “He [an executive] has a direct responsibility to his 
employers.  That responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance to their desire… 
to make as much money as possible.”35 
Contractarians reject the notion of the corporation being a body independent of the 
shareholders and in fact reject the very idea of corporation.  It is merely a nexus of 
contracts.  Logically, it cannot have obligations distinct from the obligations of its 
individual members.  Therefore, the notion of corporate social responsibility—as distinct 
from the responsibilities of the individual shareholders—is a non-sequitor.  It is simply a 
logical contradiction.  
 
In the contractarian view, as Millon explains it: 
 
state corporate law provides the terms of the contract by which shareholders 
purchase management's undivided loyalty to their welfare… to the extent that 
 
32 Bratton makes the argument that this view of the corporations goes back to the nineteenth century. Id. 
33 Coase supra n. 20.  But see, Bratton id. 
34 Coase op. cit discussed as the source of the 1980’s nexus of contracts theorists in Millon, supra n. 23, at 
229-232. Note Joo’s discussion of the difference between economists’ understanding of contracts and legal 
understanding contracts, in Thomas W. Joo “Corporations Theory And Corporate Governance 
Law: Contract, Property, and the Role of Metaphor in Corporations Law,” 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 779, 
789-804. This issue for economic contractarians is:  How the owner-shareholder principal can control and 
limit the manager-agent sufficiently to minimize “managerial opportunism” or “agency costs”.  They find 
answers in the markets for capital, corporate control and management skill, and secondarily in the body of 
corporate law.  Bottomley, supra n. 22, at 285-287.  The issue first was given its modern analysis by Berle 
and Means. 
35 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 
1970, at SM17. 
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management's pursuit of shareholder welfare threatens nonshareholder interests, 
workers, creditors, and other affected nonshareholders are free to bargain with 
shareholders (through their agents) for whatever protections they are willing to 
pay for.  This view assumes that feasible (that is, not excessively costly) 
contracting strategies exist for correction of the harmful external effects of 
shareholder/management activity and, perhaps, that such effects are relatively 
uncommon.36 
Social costs, therefore, are simply those things that parties not party to the corporate 
contract have failed to bargain for.  Many advocates of this view fail to recognize that 
markets are inevitably incomplete, do not exist for many social costs, and accordingly, 
cannot be considered an appropriate or sufficient solution to social costs. 37 
Social costs in this model are part and parcel of this group’s business activities, and as 
such, those who complain about them should be subject to the same constraints and 
bargaining positions as any other member of society, including those contracting together 
forming the corporate contract.  The core contractors are the shareholders and thus their 
interests should be the focus of corporate concern.  This focus leads to the related 
contractarian model known as the shareholder primacy model.  
 
c) Criticisms of the Models  
The contractarian model has number of shortcomings.  Critically, it fails to explain the 
most significant feature of the corporation: that is to say it does not account for limited 
liability.38 Nor do contractarian models adequately address other corporate rights such as 
 
36 David Millon “New Directions In Corporate Law Communitarians,  Contractarians, And The Crisis In 
Corporate Law,” 50 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1379 (1993). 
37 B. Greenwald and J.E. Stiglitz “Externalities in Economics with Imperfect Information and Incomplete 
Markets” 101 (2) QUARTERLY J. OF ECONOMICS, 229-64 (1986).  Social costs are defined by some 
commentators as those things for which no market exists.  See discusison of Section 4 Costs below. 
38 Dine notes the state involvement in creating the limited liability aspect of corporations.  This grant of 
limited liability is what made corporations such an attractive option for conducting business (Eley v. 
Positive Government Life Assurance (1876) 1 ExD 88,) and essentially what gave rise to their dominance in 
commerce. supra n. 19, at 4.  The explanation that this would eventually have been contracted for, 
according to Dine, is not supported by the facts.  One solution proposed by scholar Michael Whincup,
“Inequitable Incorporation--The Abuse of a Privilege”, 2 COMPANY LAW 158, 158-60 (1981). The English 
law still rests on the decision of the House of Lords in Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. 75 L.T.R. 426 (1897). 
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the right to hold property and the right to freedom of expression, which rights are held by 
the corporation independently of its members. 
 
An important aspect of some social costs, as we shall see, is that they arise precisely 
because of inabilities to contract.  Markets will always be incomplete, and accordingly, to 
suggest that social costs are a mere problem of contracting suggests a failure to 
understand the nature of the problem (to address social costs in the market would require 
new types of property to be created and distributed) and the nature of markets as 
incomplete along with other market failures. 
 
The univocal focus on efficiency39 supported by contractarian models brings the question 
of why efficiency should be set as the prime value.  As Millon observes:  
 
References to efficiency simply beg the underlying question of why efficiency 
should provide the sole normative criterion.  As a society we have not embraced 
the market as a totalizing model for the definition of rights and responsibilities.40 
Furthermore, this focus on the bottom line always creates a strong incentive to externalize 
costs, increase production, and thereby increase profit.41 As Horrigan observes: 
 
financially based shareholder focus… allows corporations to externalize the costs 
of maximizing stock prices onto everyone except the stockholders’ the includes 
employees, the environment, consumers, suppliers and the community at large.42 
Contractarians are focused on internal corporate activity and apply a cost-benefit analysis 
to a relatively narrow range of items that are more susceptible to numeric measurement.   
 
39 Contractarians’ efficiency focus follows closely on the economists’ view that creating wealth is the sole 
objective of corporate activity.  Any increase in wealth is a social benefit, and permits turning a blind eye to 
the distribution of that wealth or the costs of producing that wealth.   
40 Millon, supra n. 36, 1386. 
41 See Kaldor-Hicks theory discussed Dine, supra n. 21,  9 and ROBIN MALLOY LAW AND MARKET 
ECONOMY, (2000) 154-155. 
42 Brian Horrigan, “Fault Lines In the Intersection between Corporate Governance and Social 
Responsibility,” 25 UNSW L.J. 515 (2002) 550. 
55259-text.native.1157938490 17
Critics of the concessionaire model, such as Easterbrook and Fischel, note that people 
will choose to associate in manners suitable to their interests, regardless of government 
recognition.  Accordingly, they claim that such things as limited liability would have 
been contracted for had the government not granted it through legislation.  Further, 
concessionaire critics point to the non-existence or fictional nature of the “body” of the 
corporation.  Where is the “concession,” or “community” apart from the freely 
contracting members?  To have anything more or other than the individuals is non-sense, 
in the most literal sense of the term. 
 
Ultimately, we are left with Hart’s observation: “a survey of competing theories of ‘the 
corporation’ leaves one to conclude that none has survived intact.”43 
d) The Ideological Divide 
Underlying this war of models is a much deeper ideological conflict.  Contractarian 
advocates start from the idea that people are isolated autonomous rights bearers.  
Included among their sui generis rights is the right to decide how to dispose of their 
property rights and in the case of the corporation, their property rights as shareholders.  
They view the corporation as a nexus of contracts between private individuals in which 
the government has no business.   
 
Communitarian advocates, by way of contrast, view the individual as set in a context, and 
that context is a social context.  They view liberty as having positive duties.  From their 
perspective: “Liberty is empty without taking into account those primary needs upon 
which adequate conceptions of individual dignity and human flourishing depend.”44 
They view the corporation as a social body, as a member of society, and a significant 
member at that.  They emphasize the power and effects of corporations in society.  In 
addition, communitarians are, in Millon’s words, “skeptical about the practical efficacy 
 
43 Quoted in Eric Orts, “The Complexity And Legitimacy Of Corporate Law” (1993) 50 WASH & LEE L. 
REV. 1565, 1570. 
44 Millon supra n. 36, 1382-3. 
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of contract as a mechanism by which nonshareholders can protect themselves ex ante 
from… harmful effects.”45 
As Millon frames the debate “what does set communitarians apart from contractarians is 
the communitarians' strong skepticism toward the baseline presumption that contract 
alone should specify the terms of corporate governance relationships.”46 At a 
fundamental ideological level, contractarians and communitarians are divided.  
Contractarians believe that justice is manifest in the status quo and the only legitimate 
interests are those bargained for.  : “For communitarians,’ as Millon puts it “justice does 
not require endorsement of the existing distribution of wealth and bargaining capability.  
They seek instead to reform corporate law so as to foster individual dignity and promote 
societal welfare.”47 Such deep ideological debates are not about to be settled on the basis 
of superiority of models.48 
The importance of how one understands the corporation should not be underestimated.49 
If one views it as a government franchise, the government has a right to control it, and 
society has a right to demand certain behaviours of it, including internalizing social costs.  
If, however, one views the corporation as a mere official recognition of a spontaneously 
occurring organization of individuals, there is no justification for governmental 
interference.  The simple fact that some individuals have decided to come together to 
conduct business does not suddenly or automatically give the government the right to 
interfere in the private affairs of its citizens, and certainly to placing additional 
obligations on the individuals who form the corporate contract. 
 
45 Id 1380 
46 Id 1381 
47 Id 1386.  In Millon’s review of Chayes’s theories, he summarizes the issue at a personal level: “Having 
induced nonshareholders to rely on legitimate expectations of fair dealing, shareholders therefore may 
forfeit the right to insist on contract terms guaranteeing profits at the expense of others.”  David Millon, 
“The Ambiguous Significance Of Corporate Personhood:  Working Paper No. 01-6 January 2001 
Washington & Lee Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, 23. 
48 See Wetlaufer, discussed supra n. 7. 
49 See Sheehy,  supra n. 18. 
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Perhaps most significantly, regardless of the model one accepts or what view one takes of 
the corporation, any political positivist analysis makes obvious the observation that 
corporations have grown in terms of their power.  Their economic might and control over 
resources is astounding.  No less than fifty of the world’s largest one hundred economies 
are corporate bodies, and studies indicate that the control of these bodies tends to be 
concentrated in the hands of a very small number of people.50 
e) Shareholder primacy 
The model of the corporation in vogue at the present is a variant of the contractarian 
model, known to business scholars as the shareholder primacy or profit maximization 
model.51 This view is that the corporation’s objective or raison d’etre is to produce the 
greatest profit.  Although various reason are advanced as to why shareholders of all the 
corporation’s suppliers should be privileged above all others, none is particularly 
convincing, at least in larger corporations.52 In order to do so, it must have high revenues 
and low costs.  In other words, it must be efficient.  This use of the term efficiency is 
important and should be distinguished from the similar but different use of the term 
efficiency as used by economists.  To economists efficiency means making the most 
 
50 For a listing of the world’s  100 largest economies in 2000 which shows ranking and identifies the 
corporations see the list compiled by the Policy Research Institute at Corporations.org 
http://www.corporations.org/system/top100.html For an insightful analysis of corporate power in law and 
society, see Roger Cotterell, The Sociology Of Law, (1992) 123-130.  Leading Australian corporate law 
scholar, Paul Redmond observes: “Adolph Berle’s claim 40 years ago that corporate law would become the 
constitutional law of the new economic state no longer seems fanciful, if it ever did.  The distinctive social 
issues posed by the corporate ascendancy need to be addressed…” P. REDMOND, COMPANIES AND 
SECURITIES LAW: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS, 3RD ED, (2000), vii. 
51 M. Jensen, “Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function,” 14(3) J. 
OF APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8–21(2001). Smith, "The Shareholder Primacy Norm," 23 J. Corp. L. 277, 302-03 
(1998). Henry Hansmann And Reinier Kraakman “The End Of History For Corporate Law” January 2000 
Yale Law School Working Paper No. 235; NYU Working Paper No. 013; Harvard Law School Discussion 
Paper No. 280; Yale SOM Working Paper No. ICF - 00-09 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=204528 For some criticisms identifying the flaws of 
shareholder primacy model, Mirsch, Michaels, and Friedman, “Clean Models v Dirty Hands” Why 
Economics is Different from Sociology,” In ZUKIN AND DIMAGGIO EDS., STRUCTURES OF CAPITAL: THE 
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE ECONOMY, (1990), Prentice, “Aspects of Corporate Governance Debate,” in 
PRENTICE AND HOLLAND EDS., CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1993). 
52 Jennifer Hill, “Public Beginnings Private Ends:  Should Corporate Law Privilege the Interests of 
Shareholders?” 9 AJCL 21 (1998). 
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effective use of resources in creating the maximum product possible from those 
resources.  Business scholars mean creating the maximum profit from the resources.  
 
While both scholars deal with money as the main resource, the difference is in the means 
to or view of the end product.  The economist is concerned with both internalities and 
externalities, and so, how these things are accounted for whether public or private is 
irrelevant.  The business scholar, however, sees a great distinction between internalities 
and externalities.  For the business scholar, the greater the negative externalities, the 
greater the positive internalities or “profit” and hence the more attractive the enterprise 
appears to be.  Getting more of the costs outside of the corporation, or in other words, the 
more one is able to externalize the negatives the more profitable, or desirable what 
remains is.  Hence it is only logical to observe that increased activity of business 




The next important discussion concerns the notion of costs.   At its most basic level, the 
existence of a thing precludes the non-existence of that same thing.  This mutually 
exclusive existence-non-existence condition creates what economists refer to as an 
externality.  That is, each condition creates an inevitable anti-condition or “externality.”53 
Externalities are either positive (beneficial) or negative (harmful).  When the externality 
is negative, it is called a cost.  Costs are the negative impact or loss of any activity or 
thing.   
 
Externalities are explained by Cooter and Ulen as a problem that occurs when “the utility 
or production functions of different people are interdependent,… [imposing] benefits or 
costs upon each other, regardless of whether or not they have agreed” and are 
 
53 Interestingly, some calculations indicate that the total economic production of activity on the planet 
results in a net loss once all “externalities” are factored in.  Accordingly, the terminology of “externality” 
has been questioned. Kysar, supra n. 2, 35.  The problem of externalities in economics was first identified 
by A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 149-79 (1920). 
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externalities “because the costs or benefits are conveyed outside of a market.” 54 As noted 
in the Introduction to this article the topic is social cost—i.e. the cost to the people who 
make up society. 
 
There have been a number of approaches to the problem of social costs.  One approach to 
social costs has been to increase private property.  Hardin’s famous article “The Tragedy 
of the Commons”55 is often cited as the proof positive of the impossibility of preserving 
the environment without private property rights.  In his startling article, Hardin observed 
that when people had unlimited access to communal property or “commons”, their 
overuse of the commons led to its demise.  By way of contrast, Hardin observed that 
private property is maintained at sustainable levels.  From this observation, Hardin 
concluded that the best way to preserve things held in common is to break up the 
commons, destroying public property rights and create private property.56 
Hardin’s argument has been adopted as a model for much economic thought  and 
subsequent policy; however, as we have seen, social costs are mounting in both quantity 
and seriousness of consequence.57 This conclusion too should cause us to re-examine 
Hardin’s approach.  Hardin’s analysis is based on the usefulness of common property 
rights, or more accurately, the results of holding property in common.  The general 
analysis, however, fails to acknowledge that the destructive impact of common use only 
occurred once the profit motive was introduced.58 In other words, as long as people are 
 
54 ROBERT COOTER AND THOMAS ULEN LAW AND ECONOMICS 2ND ED. 139 (1997). 
55 Garrett Hardin. "The Tragedy of the Commons," 162 SCIENCE, 1243-1248, 1246 (1968).  Available on 
line at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/reprint/162/3859/1243.pdf?ijkey=W762Xr9TwfD4g
56 The discussion which ensues ignores that property is a social construction, meaning that property is 
whatever a society decides to recognize and value.  Examples of property can include honours, offices, and 
humans.  See M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENCE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY, (1983), 7-9.  
See, or course, Aristotle’s discussion of such in NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, (1980) trans. by  D. Ross, Bk. 5, 
Ch. 2, 3. 
57 Hardin was an internationally recognized authority on population control and policy.  It is worthwhile to 
note that he was not blind to the coordination problem in pollution control matters and indeed it was one of 
his concerns in writing his piece.  See for example, his discussion in Tragedy, supra n. 55. 
58 D. Feeny et al “The Tragedy of the Commons: Twenty years later” in (18) 1 HUMAN ECOLOGY.(1990) 1-
19.  See the discussion in Ortega Santos, Antonio. 2000. "Commons: Past and Present, in Mediterranean 
Societies: Property Rights and Modes of Use." Presented at "Constituting the Commons: Crafting 
Sustainable Commons in the New Millenium", the Eighth Conference of the International Association for 
the Study of Common Property, Bloomington, Indiana, USA, May 31-June 4 
http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/archive/00000320/00/santosa040800.pdf
55259-text.native.1157938490 22
using goods in common for their own sustenance needs, they are more than willing and 
able to manage property communally.59 Once, however, the ability to profit is 
introduced, the over-exploitation of the resource occurs and some form of control over 
the exploitation of the resource appears necessary.  Still, whether that control is best done 
by means of privatization or some other regulatory regime, remains unclear.60 
Other criticisms of Hardin’s view have been developed.61 For example, scholars have 
noted that Hardin’s assumption that the only rational behaviour is to increase material 
consumption without regard for leisure, cultural or intellectual activities.62 Further, 
Hardin equates self-interest with certain ideas about private property, individual freedom, 
and the utility of maximizing wealth in the free market system. In essence, Hardin’s 
thesis is “that people cannot work out sustainable ways to utilize common-property 
resources on their own”63 and therefore, all property must be given over to private 
control.  Hardin’s thesis has been a critical in supporting corporate domination of more 
and more of the commons, for if individuals cannot organize the commons as common 
property, more private property must be created, and those with the capital to accumulate 
the property have the social obligation, one could argue, to do so.  It is a basic 
justification for corporate domination of the world. 
 
59 Cooter and Ulen note the example of Icelandic pastoralists limiting the number of animals permitted into 
the summer pastures. Supra n. 54, 148.  But this phenomena was common in feudal England and with the 
land use practices of the Scottish crofters as well.  Cooter and Ulen’s analysis is helpful in stipulating the 
particular conditions conducive to the common approach, and contrast it with the over use of oyster beds in 
New England.  However, their analysis does not go far enough to include the profit motive. For a broader 
consideration of the notion of public good which challenges the basic assumptions of the non-rivalrous 
consumption and non-excludability criterion, see Katharina Holzinger “The Provision of Transnational 
Common Goods: Regulatory Competition for Environmental Standards,” In COMMON GOODS:
REINVENTING EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, ED. A. HÉRITIER. (2001). Boulder, CO. 
60 COOTER AND ULEN, supra n. 54. 
61 For a sophisticated analysis of the coordination problem and response from economists known as 
ecological economists, see Kysar, supra n. 2. Pierre Lasserre and Antoine Soubeyran “A Ricardian Model 
of the Tragedy of the Commons” Working Paper No. 20-01 (February 2001)  
http://www.economie.uqam.ca/cahiers/wp20-01.pdf
62 On the importance, valuing and meaning of these and a theory of goods in general, see WALZER supra n. 
56. 
63 Paul B. Trawick “Successfully Governing the Commons: Principles of Social Organization in an Andean 
Irrigation System,” 29 HUMAN ECOLOGY,1, 2 (2001). 
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Another approach to costs has been legal.  Traditionally, law has been the way of dealing 
with problematic costs between people.  Either through legislation or by common law, 
law has been able to resolve property rights disputes through its various principles and 
doctrines.  These principles include notions of justice and rights, and the doctrines 
include the doctrines of nuisance, causation, and rights in rem and in personam. More 
recently, law and economics have been combined to develop an economic analysis of 
traditional legal problems.  A leader in this new discipline of law and economics64 is the 
University of Chicago economist, Ronald Coase, to whose analysis we now turn. 
 
a) Coase’ Theory on Social Costs 
Coase’s landmark article “The Problem of Social Costs”65 is an elegant argument, 
concerning cattle herdsmen and farmers, doctors and confectioners, and neighbours of 
adjoining properties.  His article is an effort to demonstrate that people will resolve their 
disputes smoothly regardless of what the law says.  Essentially, Coase argues that where 
people can bargain, they will bargain for the rights that will bring them the best return on 
their investment, and further, that where they can do so in a costless environment without 
legally imposed liability structure, they will do so creating from an economic perspective, 
the most efficient use of resources and maximum level of production. 
 
Coase correctly identifies the issue as “should A be allowed to harm B or should B be 
allowed to harm A?”  Coase is also correct in his analysis: from an economic perspective, 
Who gets the right to harm is irrelevant.66 
To make his point, Coase examines the case of Bryant v. Lever67 in which the court had 
to decide the rights as between neighbours.  Should a neighbour who had been using his 
chimney for several years without problems have the right to continue to do so?  Or 
should the other neighbour be permitted to stack wood on top of his house for his own 
 
64 Minda, supra n.5 604 
65 Coase, supra n. 20 1. 
66 This perspective is what is so foreign to lawyers and most people.  Both legal and traditional thinking is 
that it does matter who does what do whom.  This issue from this perspective is who caused the harm, and 
that person is the one who should pay for damage.  COOTER AND ULEN, supra n. 54. 
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benefit although causing the neighbour’s chimney to smoke?  Coase said the issue should 
be resolved by the economics of the situation.   
 
From Coase’s  economic perspective, the problem is caused in part by each party—the 
one party by lighting his chimney and the other party by stacking wood.  He suggests that 
the case should be solved by looking at the economic costs and economic benefits 
generated by the activities, and then engaging in transacting so as to produce the most 
efficient outcome.  Causation is not the issue—the issue is permitting activities which 
make the most of the resources. 
 
Coase points out that: 
The reasoning employed by the courts in determining legal rights will often seem 
strange to an economist because many of the factors on which the decision turns 
are, to an economist, irrelevant.  Because of this, situations which are, from an 
economic point of view, identical will be treated quite differently by the courts.  
The economic problem in all cases of harmful effects is how to maximise the 
value of production.68 
The court’s analysis of Bryant v. Lever was based on the doctrine of lost grant.  Lord 
Cotton identified the legal issue as identifying rights in order to trace causation and to 
identify in turn whose right preceded whose. This activity he recognized is as an 
ultimately a fruitless exercise.  From the legal perspective then, the issue becomes a 
matter of pragmatics.  The law solves the problem by drawing an arbitrary line, calls it 
the “doctrine of lost grant” and finishes the case.   
 
Coase’s comment about this legal solution is humourous. He writes: “the ‘doctrine of lost 
grant’ is about as relevant as the colour of judge’s eyes.”69 But the legal doctrine 
embodies old solutions to problems only relatively recently recognized by economists.  
To explain this legal result in terms meaningful to an economist, one would say that to 
follow the line of causation all the way back in history to the right associated with the 
 
67 4. C.P.D. 172, (1878-1879), cited in Coase, supra n. 20, 11.  Coase’s assumption is that all activity is to 
be measured against or valued by its relation to production.  
68 Coase supra n. 20, 17. 
69 Id 15. 
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original owners and then trace them forward through title is to increase information costs 
exponentially and fail to appreciate bounded rationality of the human condition.  Coase 
has failed to address one of law’s benefits: the reasoning for legal rules, and in this case, 
limited information and information costs, undetected externalities, the incremental 
nature of some externalities, and the fundamental fairness required for a society to 
continue peacefully.  For the economist, the role of law is solely to define legal rights and 
provide predictability.70 These legal rights and institutions permit people to act in self-
interested ways without regard for the non-legally enforceable (property) rights of 
others.71 Economics fails to appreciate much about law and the society it promotes.72 
In Coase’s hypothetical world, aside from property rights law is irrelevant because it does 
not add to efficiency and hence does not add to overall social product.  People resolve 
their disputes on the basis of the dollar value of an activity.  Which activities should be 
undertaken are determined on the basis of the total social value of potential production.  
This calculative exercise, argues Coase, should include total social costs.  Imposition of 
liability by law makers should be avoided as creating legal liabilities increases transaction 
costs.  Reallocation in a society with legally imposed liability schemes impairs achieving 
increased social production because the parties are forced to expend greater effort to 
reallocate the resources.   
 
Given the importance of his insight and the remarkably broad application his theory has 
found, it is unfortunate that Coase has identified only one of the assumptions of his 
model: that it works only in a zero-transaction cost environment.73 Had he considered 
 
70 Id 21.   
71 Id. 31.  Cooter and Ulen note this as the costs of non-cooperative legal rules in their example where 
instead of relying on competitive legal rules, by coincidence, a cattle rancher and corn farmer get married. 
Supra n. 54, 80 
72 Robin Malloy attempts to address this problem in his book, Law and the Market Economy by discussing 
semiotics, although his success in doing so may be questioned. 
73 Despite the acclaim his article received, subsequent studies have put his views into doubt.  More recent 
studies suggest he may not be correct.  See for example, Dan Usher, “The Coase theorem is tautological, 
incoherent or wrong,” 61 ECON. LETTERS 3, 3 (1998). Cooter “Coase” in the NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS. Andrew Halpin “Disproving The Coase Theorem?” working paper of the author at University 




other assumptions, his theorem may have contributed to a much deeper, more broadly 
socially beneficial outcome and included more forcefully the social costs he considered.  
Having limited his discussion of the phenomena of social costs in private transactions and 
his explanation of assumptions to the zero-transaction costs environment, he draws the 
economic conclusion that the initial allocation of rights is unimportant.  His argument, 
however, is meaningless in the real world—and interestingly, this criticism is not a 
criticism with which he would disagree.74 As he explains, economic analysis has a 
different objective, to which we turn next. 
 
b) Coase’s Recommendations: Private vs. Public 
For Coase, the public-private distinction is irrelevant.  The issue is maximizing overall 
social product.  Coase suggests that the appropriate level of analysis in nuisance is total 
social product and rights, not things such as factories, smoke and homes.75 The issue for 
Coase is: “one of choosing the appropriate social arrangement for dealing with the 
harmful effects.  All solutions have costs.”76 
Coase identifies three alternative social arrangements or orderings of production: 
government, the private firm, and do nothing.  He allows that at times government may 
more efficiently deliver services, but to him, the central distinction is that government has 
the power to seize private property.77 
Coase’s analysis has broad implications for law.  In matters of nuisance or social costs, 
traditional legal analysis gets it wrong. As he puts it “the belief that it is desirable that the 
business which causes harmful effects should be forced to compensate those who suffer 
damage is undoubtedly the result of not comparing the total product obtainable with 
alternative social arrangements.” 78 As he observes: “The proper procedure is to compare 
the total social product yielded by  these different arrangements.  The comparison of 
 
74 Coase argues that economic argument needs to be more focused on reality.  
75 Coase supra n. 20, 45-46. 
76 Id, 20. 
77 Id 19. 
78 Id, 42. 
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private and social products is neither here nor there.”79 But there are a number of highly 
problematic assumptions inherent in his approach in which all is merely a matter of the 
transaction of property rights. We turn to discuss these assumptions next.   
 
c) Coase’s Assumptions 
Consider, for example, that Coase’s transaction of property rights approach fails to 
address adequately the problem of non-identified commons, and people without resources 
to pay for things or rights they value.  All of Coase’s examples deal with individuals who 
have property—i.e. wealth.  Coase does not deal with those who do not have sufficient 
resources.   
 
Furthermore, Coase does not seem to consider that private firms do the equivalent of 
government seizure when they utilize the commons by their externalities.  Such activity is 
equivalent to seizure of the commons.  Additionally, the only value is the economic 
value, or more accurately, the revenue generating possibilities of the property.  There is 
no discussion of fairness or such things as happiness that make life worthwhile, known to 
economists as “psychic income.”80 
Further, Coase does not look at the non-monetized costs.  What are the costs to the 
comfort of the family without a chimney?  Put differently, what is the value of the 
individual and individual rights in a society.  Consider, for example, that perhaps the 
family will be more susceptible to illness, or if it is forced to move, the members may 
suffer from increased insecurity and not be able to make an adjustment socially, at school 
or at work. He does not discuss the fact that a person with more assets has more mobility, 
and so has more alternatives, and ultimately a stronger bargaining position than someone 
 
79 Id, 36. 
80 Lester C. Thurow, “Psychic Income: Useful or Useless?” 68(2), THE AMERICAN ECON. REV., Papers and 
Proceedings of the Ninetieth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. (May, 1978), 142-
145. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-
8282%28197805%2968%3A2%3C142%3APIUOU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A 
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who is poor.81 He does not seem to identify the problem faced by people without the 
alternative of moving, or not having cash to buy the right to have a chimney extended to 
stave off the cold of winter, nor yet the unfairness some economic outcomes may impose 
on the parties.   
 
d) Criticisms of Coase82 
81 Coase alludes to the further problem of unequal parties bargaining with each other when he states “What 
payment would in fact be made would depend on the shrewdness of the farmer and the cattle raiser as 
bargainers. Supra n. 20, 5 
82 There are many criticisms of Coase that could be included.  Perhaps the most penetrating criticism, 
particularly of Coase’s view that private property rights are the best solution to social costs is V.V. Chari 
and Larry E. Jones, “A Reconsideration of the problem social cost: Free riders and monopolists” 16(1) 
ECONOMIC THEORY 1 (2000). 
For purposes of brevity and focus the criticisms discussed in the body of the paper are only those with the 
most direct bearing on the matter.  In thinking about Coase, however, one must consider the broader issues 
which Coase’ hypothetical world fails to address such as who values and transacts public goods and how?  
A dollar value on public goods does not address the actual value received by the public from the public 
good. Take for example, Coase’s rancher and farmer.  What is the value to the public of a herd of cattle as 
opposed to a field of corn?  The considerations are not what Coase has identified: again, his analysis is far 
too limited in its perspective.  In his example there are also the problems of methane gas produced by 
cattle, as well as the pollution to streams from their wastes.  Further, the production of cattle increases the 
demands on the land for producing cattle feed and reduces the land available for other uses.  Nor yet does it 
take account for the fact that cattle grazing accounts for 35% of the erosion of the planet’s arable land.   
Similarly, corn production requires consideration of the costs and benefits of monoculture agricultural 
production.  The inputs of energy to create fertilizer, pesticides, herbicides, as well as the destruction of the 
soil by compaction of the soil and monoculture itself need to be considered.  Furthermore, each of these 
facets of corn production have long term, environmental effects such as algae blooms in significant areas of 
the ocean, dying rivers and the exhaustion of the soil requiring the removal of land from agricultural use.  
The marginal utility of land is a more difficult calculation as it includes not only the above mentioned 
factors but also change will be forced in production as a result of depletion of the world’s petroleum 
resources, loss of productive land due to global warming and increased demand for food production 
resulting from the world’s population doubling over the next fifty years. Society needs to make hard 
decisions about whether more cattle feed for the inefficiencies of wealthy beef eating consumers or more 
efficiently for food for the rest world needs to be produced. Such concerns are, of course, the complexities 
that concerned Keynes. See Anna Carabelli and Nicolo De Vecchi, (2000) “Individuals, Public Institutions 
and Knowledge: Hayek and Keynes,” IN P.PORTA, R. SCAZZIERI, A.SKINNER (EDS), KNOWLEDGE, SOCIAL
INSTITUTIONS AND THE DIVISION OF LABOUR, 232. 
Given the immense amount of information needed to be collected, processed, analyzed, not to mention the 
matters of probability, and uncertainty, suggest that economic analysis alone is not sufficient to rely on.  
The costs of error in such calculations are too great to imagine, and accordingly, it may be appropriate to 
look to some other tools or values in preserving the planet. 
Thus, the inability to calculate these goods suggests that Coase’s view of the matter while interesting and 
helpful at a micro-level is of next to no use at a macro level.  Coase does address some of these objections 
such as the overall damage of activities directly and such non-economic values as poor people needing 
food, (supra n. 20, 24) the value of social peace by preventing nuisance by using reasonable care and not 
waiting until there is complaint --quoting with approval from the case of Andreae v. Selfridge and 
Company Ltd; (Id. 23) however, the “Coasean” tradition, (See his Nobel Lecture) like the Pigovian 
tradition he complains about, (Id. 17)  has been taken to mean something else.  
http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/1991/coase-lecture.html
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As noted, Coase’s work has received wide acclaim.  Indeed, he has been awarded the 
Nobel Prize in Economics for his work.  Due to its pervasive use and citation, it merits a 
careful and thorough criticism.  Despite its general acceptance, Coase’s work has not 
been received with equanimity in the legal, economics, or law and economics 
communities.83 Among the most trenchant of the criticism are those raised by Cooter in 
his article “The Costs of Coase.”84 Cooter notes, among other criticisms, that Coase’s 
examination is limited exclusively to one-on-one strategic game situations.  This 
limitation is critical for a number of reasons.85 First, and perhaps most importantly, such 
strategic games are zero sum.  In such games, no rational player is willing to give up 
more in order to resolve the solution and so the problems posed are in fact, intractable.86 
Accordingly, there is no rational solution. 
 
Coordination problems are those types of problems that require coordination of differing 
and conflicting interests among parties who together form a united whole.  Coordination 
problems make up the vast majority of society’s problems including social costs—yet 
Coase’s solution does not address these either.  Finally, Cooter notes that Coase operates 
on a very optimistic assumption, that despite the aforementioned intractability caused by 
the rationality assumption, people will cooperate.  As Cooter puts it, the opposite and 
more realistic assumption is a pessimistic one, one which he calls the “Hobbes 
Theorem.”87 In Hobbes’ view of society, people will fight rather than share.  Where such 
is the case, Coase’s theory is useless beyond its value as an intellectual exercise.  
 
In fact, Coase does not claim that his paper is about the irrelevance of liability in a situation which is free 
from transaction costs.  Nor is his paper about irrelevance of the initial allocations of rights.  Rather he 
identifies the point of his paper clearly and quite contrary to these various interpretations.  He suggests that 
the goal of his article is to “indicate what the economic approach to the problem should be.”  It is not 
prescriptive of the total approach.  In his own words, the point of his paper is that while “it would clearly be 
desirable if the only action performed were those in which what was gained was worth more than what was 
lost.  But in choosing between social arrangements… we should have regards for the total effect.  This, 
above all, is … [the] approach which I am advocating.” 
83 There is empirical evidence that the Coase theorem is incorrect.  See note 73 supra.  How counterfactual 
evidence is dealt with is a particular problem for economics and challenges its claims to be a science.  See 
Hausman, supra n. 16. 
84 Robert Cooter “The Cost of Coase,” 11 J. OF LEGAL STUDIES, 14 (1982). 
85 Id 
86 Id. 
87 Id.  Cooter develops a valuable normative theorem concerning the role of law from his Hobbes’ 
Theorem.  He writes: “the normative Hobbes theorem: Structure the law so as to minimize the harm caused 
by failures in private agreements.” Cooter and Ulen, supra n. 54, 90.  This theorem’s importance to the 
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If one accepts Cooter’s criticism, it leads to Coase’s second ordering of production, 
namely, a dominant role for government.  It is government’s job to coordinate diverse 
interests, not private individuals who have their own means—money, power and 
violence—to impose their “solutions” on the rest of society.88 In other words, social 
costs are no longer a mere concern of bargaining as between two individuals, nor yet a 
smaller group of easily identifiable individuals.  It is a matter to be dealt with exactly by 
such mechanisms as liability created by law.  This conclusion is controversial because 
Coase’s thought and neo-classicism in law and economics, discussed next, is usually used 
to support the opposite conclusion—namely, that private orderings are preferable to any 
and all government orderings. 
 
5) LAW AND ECONOMICS 
 
a) The L&E Model of the corporation 
In the last decades of the twentieth century Corporate law has been dominated by Law 
and Economics.89 Easterbrook and Fischel’s “The Economic Structure of Corporate 
Law”90 is a monumental work in the intellectual landscape of both Law and Economics 
(L&E) and corporate law.  It quite clearly sets out the agenda of the corporation and 
makes a coherent normative argument for rationalizing, selecting and developing 
corporate law along a single path.  
 
matter will be discussed below as structuring law to minimize social costs, and hence, reform corporate law 
along these lines. 
88 See for example, matters raised by HAROLD DEMSETZ OWNERSHIP, CONTROL AND THE FIRM, (1988) 261-
81 and in particular, his criticism of Block.  This point, of large scale coordination problems being 
particularly intractable with respect to externalities is the topic of V.V. Chavi & Larry Jones, “A 
reconsideration of the problem of social cost: Free riders and monopolists” (2000) 16 Economic Theory, 1.  
They observe “In large economies with decentralized systems, problems caused by externalities lead to 
outcomes far from the efficient level.” 19.  Although somewhat technical in parts, it is clear that the issue 
of incomplete markets for externalities discussed by Coase, that the market solution is simply not viable.  
89 Minda supra n. 5.   
90 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK AND DANIEL R. FISCHEL THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 
(1991) 
55259-text.native.1157938490 31
As they state in the preface “we conclude that corporate law has an economic structure 
that increases wealth of all by supplying the rules that investors would select if it were 
easy to contract more fully.”91 They spend the balance of their work examining the 
general principles of corporate law and the specific rules that support that conclusion. 
Generally, they argue that corporate law is what investors would select if they were given 
the opportunity to contract, namely, efficiency leading to wealth maximization.  Their 
attention is drawn to and focused upon the economic explanations of corporate law’s 
principles and rules.  The crux of the dilemma from their perspective is finding a balance 
between the ability to raise funds and the ability to control management.92 
Easterbrook and Fischel start their explication of corporate law with a few short answers 
for their would be critics.  They state that large corporations, including multinationals one 
assumes, are the product of success in satisfying investors and customers.93 In other 
words, the corporations that exist, exist because they are the best.  It is a robust view of 
survival of the fittest, the most worthy survive and grow, the weaker, inferior ones die.  It 
suggests that the large corporation deserves its place and power because it is the best at 
what it does, or possibly, that it is most suited to the environment in which it exists.  
 
They explain their approach as positive (i.e. descriptive) rather than normative (i.e. 
prescriptive), although they admit to straying into the normative realm on occasion.  This 
approach is reasonable within their assumptions: where the corporate structure is 
supposed to reflect the investors’ wishes, and where the investors’ wishes produce the 
greatest efficiency and hence the greatest good for society, the laws indeed should reflect 
those assumptions.  Indeed, as argued here, that law “should reflect those assumptions” 
demonstrates that at times, economics cannot but be normative.  Where it has identified 
the goals and within its own limited framework, the best way to achieve those goals, to 
pursue other means is simply perverse.94 
91 Id, Preface, vii.  
92 This is a contemporary version of the A. Berle and G. Means concern resulting from the separation of 
“ownership” and management. A. BERLE AND G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY. REV. ED. (1968). 
93 Id, 4. 
94 Pouncy, supra n. 16. 
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b) Assumptions of the L&E Theory of Corporate Law 
Easterbrook and Fischel, state that they accept only one assumptions—the assumption of 
implied investor consent.  Therefore, they argue that they are engaging in a strictly 
positive exercise.  They are merely describing the corporation as they find it, and reject 
any theoretical starting point. Interestingly, before one can make sense of their argument, 
one needs to understand their theory. Both their economic theory as subscribers to neo-
classical economic theory and their theory of the corporation are quite developed and 
wide ranging. 
 
Fellow law and economics scholar, Robin Malloy, identifies the following five 
assumptions as forming the basis of neo-classical law and economics:95 
i) people are rational and therefore act in their own self-interest.  This position 
suggests that the appropriate role of central planners is minimal, and that the 
aggregate of these individual self-interested choices is the best for society. 
ii) People have complete and perfect information, and that the current 
distribution of education is appropriate.  
iii) Free movement to follow economic opportunity is available and appropriate to 
all people and that the effects of dislocation are not relevant.  
iv) Free market and competition are desirable and the outcome of competition is 
desirable, and  
v) The current distribution of wealth is accepted because it came about by just 
means and furthermore, any re-distribution would be unfair or inequitable.   
 
These neo-classical economic assumptions are fundamental to Easterbrook and Fischel’s 
work.  As applied to law, corporate law, and legal theory, the main tenets of their theory 
are that: 
 
• efficiency is the primary objective of law,  
 
95 LAW AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THEORY AND PRACTICE, (1990) 53-5. 
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• the market is the most efficient method of resource allocation, not government 
imposed distributions,  
• corporations are the best vehicle for coordinating resources,  
• utility can be equated wealth not social justice, happiness or civil peace,  
• only those with wealth sufficient to be investors need be concerned or consulted 
about resource allocation in production,  
• increasing the wealth of those with wealth is the fundamental principle of 
economic activity,  
• all other forms of wealth such as environmental wealth including biodiversity and 
clean environment, or social wealth like psychic income, cultural heritage and 
knowledge are unimportant, 
• concerns of distributive justice are irrelevant, and  
• the future of the planet and interests of future generations should be subjected to 
the appropriate present value calculations subject to present value discounting, 
which is a discounting of the value of the future.   
 
Once one accepts all of these tenets underlying their theory, one is free to move on with 
the authors, “free of theory,” to examine corporate law as it is.  As they have it, investor 
choice is optimal “because the choices do not impose cost on strangers to the contracts, 
[and so] what is optimal for the firms is optimal for society.”96 As they put it, having 
dealt with the preliminaries—the corporate contract,97 limited liability and voting in the 
introductory chapters of their work—they “arrive at the relation between shareholders 
and managers which holds center stage for the rest of this book.”98 
Easterbrook and Fischel define the corporation as an “extra-market, team method of 
production with certain costs and benefits.  Corporations are a finance device and are not 
 
96 Easterbrook supra n. 54, 6-7. 
97 Reading Joo’s work, examining “economic contract” and “legal contract” supra n. 34 alongside 
Easterbrook and Fischel’s work is an invaluable exercise which sheds considerable light on the confusion 
and consequent complexities and conundrums created by confounding economic and legal understandings 
of the term “contract.” 
98 EASTERBROOK supra n. 54, 90 
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otherwise distinctive.”99 As it is the investors who bear the risk of loss, so too, they 
should have the benefit of the reward.100 
Further concerning this nexus of contracts model, they observe, that corporate law is 
designed to support: 
The complex arrangements of many sorts that those who associate voluntarily in 
the corporation will work out among themselves.  The form of reference is a 
reminder that the corporation is a voluntary adventure, and that we must always 
examine the terms on which real people have agreed to participate.101 
Accordingly, “the role of corporate law at any instant is to establish rights among 
participants.”102 The corporation is a wonderful finance tool in which every individual 
has complete bargaining freedom to buy and sell what he or she likes at prices that reflect 
the value of those things to each party.  Working within their model, they are certainly 
correct. 
 
c) Criticisms of the L&E Model 
Given this nature of the corporation and the values of freedom of contract to many 
people, it is undoubtedly true that from a normative perspective, corporate law should 
reflect what the parties would contract, and that corporate law should be guided by the 
parties and not the regulators.103 This particular view of the corporation and the 
interested parties leads them to the interesting conclusion that the goal of the corporation 
is a matter of complete indifference.  As they put it: “what is the goal of the 
corporation?…. who cares?”104 Since all are free participants, all should be free to do as 
they choose.  Risk bearers get residual claims, non-risk bearers get fixed returns.  Should 
those who have fixed returns prefer the residual claim, it is a rather simple matter for any 
 
99 Id 10.  
100 Id 11. 
101 Id 12. 
102 Id 14 
103 Id 15. 
104 Id 35-36. Although they do not spell it out in their text, Easterbrook and Fischel are following Coase’s 
ideas on liability and allocation of rights.  Who has what rights and liabilities is irrelevant in the quest to 
increase overall social wealth.  Whatever arrangement has the greatest level of production is best, and 
Coase argues, that left to themselves without transaction costs, market players will find that arrangement on 
their own. 
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one of them to simply withdraw their fixed return investment, switch and invest in the 
residual claim.105 
Their justification for an economic analysis of corporate law is correct as far as it goes.  
As they observe, the same pressures affecting the shape of markets are the same pressures 
that affect the structure of corporate law.106 Although not identified by the authors, one 
assumes they are referring to competitive pressures arising from efficiencies.  It is 
unfortunate that they fail to identify the pressures as surely the market’s pressures include 
such things as: strategic behaviour, desire for power and dominance, defensive 
behaviours, inefficiencies caused such behaviours, and efforts to maximize profits by 
externalizing as many costs as possible.  Had they done so, their analysis of corporate law 
would have been significantly more valuable and their analysis of the corporate law and 
normative conclusions would have been much more nuanced and they wold have had to 
address at least some of the social costs which are of concern to this article. 
 
Easterbrook and Fischel acknowledge social costs but find they are best dismissed from 
an analysis of corporate law.  They write:  
We do not address optimal ways to deal with pollution, bribery, plant closings, 
and other decisions that have effects on people who may not participate in the 
corporate contract.  Society must choose whether to conscript the firm’s strength 
(its tendency to maximize wealth) by changing the prices it confronts or by 
changing its structure so that it is less apt to maximize wealth.  The latter choice 
will yield less of both good ends than the former.107 
They may be correct about their conclusion—although they provide neither evidence nor 
argument—if there is no middle ground, and if, as they suppose the soviet experience is 
the only alternative and that it has indeed failed.108 Their suppositions about wealthy 
 
105 Assuming of course that the only investment one has is financial, or alternatively that a “contractor” 
such as a telemarketing employee has sufficient funds on hand to permit them the simple switch to 
investing in dividend bearing shares the dividends of which would replace his or her income from 
telemarketing. 
106 Id 8. 
107 Id 38.  Again, like most law and economics scholars, Easterbrook and Fischel fail to explain why the 
particular goods they focus on should dominate the discussion and society as a whole.  See Walzer, supra n. 
56.  
108 See Harvard economist, Jonas Kornai, “What the Collapse of Socialism does and does not mean.” 14(1) 
J. OF ECON. PERSP, 27-42.   One also must remember that the soviet government accomplished a level of 
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firms in light of experience are questionable.  “Wealthy firms provide more jobs, …better 
working conditions and clean up their outfalls… [etc.]”109 One of the banes of the 
increasingly dominant multi-national corporations is their failure in each of these areas as 
they increasingly look to lower costs by moving to poor countries where they do none of 
the supposed wealthy firm activities.110 
Although they claim that they are not panglossian, one is hard pressed to find a better 
term with which to describe them.111 As they view it, corporate governance is really only 
a matter of better-defined property rights.  They make the assertion, without argument,  
No reagrrangement of corporate governance structures can change this [social 
costs].  The task is to establish property rights so that the firm treats the social 
costs as private ones, and so that its reactions, as managers try to maximize profits 
given these new costs… to view pollution… or other difficult moral and social 
questions as governance matters is to miss the point.112 
But these social costs are precisely the point and the current model is precisely a 
significant cause of the problem. 
 
Finally, they ignore a number of important issues.  In their analysis, the big corporation is 
big because it is fittest for survival, they ignore 1) merger and acquisitions which often 
simply absorb the success of other’s ability to innovate, produce and market, 2) 
undervaluing the actual contribution of a business to the community—corporate raiders 
look for corporations with sufficient capital to meet potential corporate liabilities which 
are often simply sustainable practices, 3) stealth, deceptive, strategic behaviour and 
efforts to create monopolies, 4) luck in timing: right place, right time, 5) the role of right 
 
industrialization in 70 years that the west required more than 200 years to accomplish.  While some may 
see this as an argument in favour of communism, it is intended as cautionary and a source for a bit of 
humility in the capitalist societies.  See Chomsky’s discussion of this error with respect to SE Asia and 
Latin America, in Chomsky supra, n. 3, 32-35, and discussion 92, 93.  
109 Id 38. 
110 STIGLITZ supra n. 3.  
111 Indeed a book review of their work in the Harvard Law Review is titled, “Dr. Pangloss meets the Coase 
Theorem.” (1992) 105 Harv. L. Rev., 1408. 
112 Id 39. 
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connections, and 6) the anti-social, un-ethical behaviour of many corporate founders and 
successors.113 
So far, we have developed an understanding of Social Costs as those costs that are borne 
by non-parties to activities, and particularly, income generating activities.  Further, we 
have seen that the traditional Social Cost analysis as developed by Coase has viewed the 
problem as solved by individual participants in a market setting rather than through law.  
We have noted that Coase’s analysis of Social Costs fails to address coordination 
problems, being those problems that involve solving conflicting interests in using goods.  
Further, we have seen that because of its commitment to neo-classical economics, law 
and economics tends to view the objective of law narrowly as maximizing wealth and to 
disregard public good.  In this context corporations and corporate law are about fulfilling 
the interests of the parties privy to the corporate contract.  It is generally assumed that 
there is but one interest and that is increasing the efficiency of corporation, and in 
particular, in the business sense of efficiency increasing internal profits—that is, by 
increasing externalities, the social costs.  This analysis allows the author to suggest that 
corporations increase social cost.  To test this hypothesis, we will now examine a 
particular case. 
 
6) CASE STUDY 
 
Perhaps the best way to understand the nature of the problem of uncontrolled social costs 
created by the Law and Economics supported nexus of contracts model of the 
corporation, is by way of a case study.  The world’s largest corporation is Wal-mart.114 
Its corporate structure is made up of six retail divisions and five specialty divisions.115 It 
 
113 The history of such behaviour is well documented from  J.P. Morgan’s kidnapping of couriers of 
competitors, to Microsoft’s continual legal battles concerning its anti-trust activities.  Some of these antics 
are noted in MAURY KLEIN, THE LIFE AND LEGEND OF JAY GOULD 80-86 (1986). 
114 Charles Fishman, “The Wal-Mart You Don’t Know: Why Low Prices have High Costs,” 77 FAST 
COMPANY MAGAZINE, 68. (Dec. 2003) 
115 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. website www.Wal-Mart.com
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is a publicly traded corporation listed on the NYSE and two other exchanges.  Majority 
shareholders include three family members, and a number of institutional investors.116 
Wal-Mart was started in the 1950’s by Sam Walton, apparently a small time store owner, 
in Bentonville, Arkansas, U.S.A.117 It started as a small department store, growing into a 
small regional chain, and then growing and spreading first through the southern United 
States of America, and then throughout the rest of the country.  It has now moved beyond 
its national focus and operates internationally. 
 
In most recent 12 month period sales were $256.3 billion in the U.S.A., and $47.5 billion 
internationally.118 It has 3,566 stores in the USA119 and 1,494 in Mexico, Puerto Rico, 
Canada, Argentina, Brazil, China, South Korea, Germany and the U.K.120 and plans to 
expand to every market which could sustain it and protect its profits.  Wal-Mart employs 
1.5 million employees121 of whom more than 1.0 million are “associates” i.e. sales clerks.  
At least 30% of Wal-Mart employees are part-time.122 Full-time at Wal-Mart means 28 
hours or more per week. Nearly 10% of all imports from China to the USA are imported 
by Wal-Mart, being of a value of about $12 billion.123 In the period 1995-2000 12% of 
the growth in productivity of the American economy is believed to have resulted from 
Wal-Mart.124 
The effects of Wal-Mart and other big-box stores is not well researched nor well 
documented.  Although a recent spate of articles has started to draw attention to the 
 
116 Yahoo Finance Quotes & Info. Wal-Mart Stores,  http://finance.yahoo.com/q/mh?s=WMT
117 Described as a “backwater” in Jeff Randall “Wonderful world of Wal-Mart” Friday, 21 February, 2003 
BBC News UK Edition. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/2787951.stm
118 Randolph T. Holhut, “The Wal-Martization of the American Economy” April 26, 2004,10(2) THE 
AMERICAN REPORTER 351.  Its profits were $6.67 billion, or about 2.3% of sales—not an impressive figure 
for retail or most industries.  
119 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. website www.Wal-Mart.com
120 Id.  
121 Id.  
122 Shils, “Measuring the Economic and Sociological Impact of the Mega-Retail Discount Chains on Small 
Enterprise in Urban, Suburban and Rural Communities” Section “Wages”  95.  Shils observes that as full-
time is considered 28 hours per week or more, the 30% part-time is an “exceedingly conservative figure.” 
Id. 
123 Fishman, supra n. 114, 68 
124 McKinsey & Co. study, cited in Fishman id. 
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issue,125 perhaps the only thorough study was done in 1997 by the leading expert on big-
box stores, Edward Shils, Director Emeritus of the Wharton Entrepreneurial Centre, at 
the University of Pennsylvania.126 The Shils Report is a landmark study of the social 
costs of this form of retailing. In his study, which Shils sub-titled: “Measuring the 
Economic and Sociological Impact of the Mega-Retail Discount Chains on Small 
Enterprise in Urban, Suburban and Rural Communities”, Shils examined the impact of 
these big-box stores on the communities in which they are located.  Shils’ study focused 
is on two big-box stores: Wal-Mart and K-mart.  The main dynamics that drew Shils’ 
attention were the effects on the traditional structure of the labour market in the 
communities, and how it worked before and after the location of a big-box retail outlet 
within a 10-15 mile radius.  Our examination of the social costs of corporations will 
begin with those identified by Shils.  After considering Shil’s comments, the article will 
turn to examine a broader group of social costs.  Given the innovative nature of the study 
it was not possible to utilize previously compiled lists.  Social costs include, breakdown 
of functioning communities, undermining markets, impoverishment of workers, harm to 
democratic institutions of government, damage to culture, damage to efforts promoting 
cooperation and conservation, and environmental pollution.  The list was compiled on the 
basis of observations concerning activities and hypothesis of costs of those activities by 
corporations in general and in certain instances, as will be clear in the discussion, by 
Wal-Mart in particular. 
 
125 Brooklyn College sociology professor’s Sharon Zukin, “We Are Where We Shop” Nov. 28, 2003 The 
New York Times, Anthony Bianco, Wendy Zellner,  Diane Brady, Mike France, Tom Lowry, Nanette 
Byrnes, Susan Zegel, Michael Arndt, Robert Berner, and Ann Therese Palmer, “Is Wal-Mart Too 
Powerful?” Business Week, Oct, 6, 2003, Jack Z. Smith, “Up against the Wal-Mart,” Star-Telegram Dec. 5, 
2003; “The Wal-Mart Effect,” Los Angeles Times 3 part series of Nov. 23-25, 2003; Randolph T. Holhut, 
“The Wal-Martization of the American Economy” April 26, 2004, 10(2) The American Reporter 351; 
Charles Fishman, “The Wal-Mart You Don’t Know: Why Low Prices have High Costs,” (Dec. 2003) Fast 
Company Magazine, Vol. 77, 68.  John Rausch “The Cost of Cheap Goods” Catholic Herald (Nov. 20, 
2003). David Olive “Values outsourced -- What are the social costs of the Wal-Mart economy?”  Oct. 18, 
2003 Toronto Star. Jim Hopkins “Wal-Mart's influence grows” 29 January 2003 USA TODAY Zukin’s 
research is contained in her book, Point of Purchase: How Shopping Changed American Culture (2003). 
Andy Rowell, “Welcome to Wal-World: Wal-Mart’s Inexhaustible March to Conquer the Globe” (2003) 24 
(10) Multinational Monitor.
http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/mm2003/03october/october03corp2.html See also Carol Bowlby, 
The Invention of Modern Shopping (2001). 
126 Another expert on Wal-Mart is Kenneth E. Stone of Iowa University; however, his focus is how to stay 
in business if Wal-Mart moves into the area. His main criticism of Wal-Mart can be found in Metropolis 
July 1997 
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a) Community impact 
Traditional western communities have thriving commercial centers.  These centers are 
composed of a mix of retail, commercial and office space.  The majority of the commerce 
in these centers is transacted through small businesses.  These businesses tend to be 
highly involved in the community, create employment which pays sufficiently to sustain 
a reasonable standard of living, pays taxes, and are innovative, community building in the 
sense of promoting ideas of individual ability, responsibility and an entrepreneurial 
spirit.127 Indeed, small business is often described as the “backbone” of an economy and 
a community128—at least in a market economy.   
 
Shils draws attention to the effects of shifting labour opportunities from the downtown 
urban areas to suburban big-box retailers.  When labour opportunities disappear 
communities fall apart.  When people do not employ their time with productive activities 
such as working in a commercial center, they turn to other unproductive activities.  
Effected malls and commercial areas tend to display levels of vacancy from 30%-40% 
after a superstore moves into the radius.  These vacancies represent significant losses of 
small businesses and mid-level incomes.129 Further, when vacancies increase and 
employment decreases, vandalism, petty crime, and drug use increase.130 
Thus, when Wal-Mart establishes a retail outlet, detrimental community effects can be 
expected.  These effects include decreased community involvement, decreased 
community building efforts, decreased small business, decreased labour opportunities, 
and increased commercial vacancies. 
 
127 Shils supra n. 122, 95.  
128 Id, 95.  The importance of small business to the Australian economy and the negative impact of big 
business and big box stores in particular on Australian economies, is discussed in detail in Amanda Gome 
“The Decline of Small Business.”  And Amanda Gome “What’s Holding Small Business Back?” BRW 
roundtable: the decline of small business, 06 May 2004 26(16) BRW MAGAZINE, 40-52. 
129 Id, 102. 
130 Id,  This vacancy and downward spiral in a center is a phenomena that first occurred in the 1960’s and 
70’s as suburbs were created in greater numbers.  The socio-economic problems of gutted city centres has 
yet to be resolved. 
55259-text.native.1157938490 41
b) Supplier Social Costs 
Another social cost imposed by big-box stores results from the demands Wal-Mart places 
on suppliers.  Having Wal-Mart as a customer has both advantages and disadvantages.  
On the one hand, the business’ sales increase dramatically.  On the other hand, the stress 
on the business increases exponentially as profit margins dip dramatically 
 
The pressure Wal-Mart place on suppliers is enormous.  Wal-Mart requires its suppliers 
to drop prices annually by as much as 5%.131 There are different responses to this type of 
pressure.  In some instances, Wal-Mart has driven its suppliers out of business.  In other 
instances whole industries, such as the orange industry in the USA, have suffered severe 
adverse effects.132 Another common response is for a business to cannibalize itself.   
This cannibalization occurs when a business is forced to undercut its own products in 
other markets (often much more profitable markets) or give up markets in order to supply 
Wal-Mart.  In other words, it is a zero-sum situation in which the change in business from 
a profitable market to Wal-Mart has no net gain to the supplier: it is pure loss.133 And the 
cost involved is borne solely by the business supplying Wal-Mart, not only through the 
cannibalization, but also in the cost of shifting production resources from one product to 
another.  Businesses contract with Wal-Mart for different reasons, including being unable 
to compete, and not having sufficient or complete information as to how Wal-Mart deals 
with its suppliers.134 
Interestingly, Wal-Mart’s suppliers are not free to talk to the press about their experiences 
for fear of retaliation or in their terms “being in the penalty-box.”135 One executive 
colourfully analogized his supplier relationship with Wal-Mart as “getting into the 
 
131 Fishman, reporting information from Bain & Co., on of the top management consulting firms in the 
world. supra n. 114, 8 
132 Id.  Given the particular nature of these problems, it is exceedingly difficult to get information.  Usually 
when businesses go bankrupt or even just out of business the information concerning causes is lost along 
with the other information management may have had.  Stiglitz notes this with respect to re-structuring in 
various countries and the resultant need to work with officials of governments not previously in favour with 
IMF administration.  STIGLITZ supra n. 3. 
133 Fishman supra n. 114. 
134 As one supplier put it, “you talk softly when you talk to God in Bentonville.” Id. 
135 Id. 
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company of version of basic training with an implacable drill sergeant.”136 The stresses 
of these pressures applied to the business are borne by management and employees.137 
Every person involved in the business from top management on down to the part-time 
floor workers are required to meet much more exacting standards—computer driven 
standards.  Humans are driven particularly hard to meet inflexible, to the second, machine 
driven standards.138 Given the cost cutting, the exacting standards, and the huge value of 
the contracts, a business simply cannot afford to fail its contractual obligations—
regardless of how unreasonably and stringently enforced.  To fulfill the demands of the 
low profit margins workers at all levels are forced to take on more responsibility and 
given less resources.  This process combined with the environment of low tolerance 
increases the level of stress and stress-related problems increase dramatically.139 
c) Labour Social Costs 
A May 2004 study released by the University of California, Berkeley entitled “The 
Hidden Public Costs of Law-wage Jobs in California”140 identifies low pay in retail as a 
serious cost to the public.  Interviews with one of the study’s authors identified Wal-Mart 
as costing California’s taxpayers $86.0 million annually as a result of under-paying its 
employees.141 They are paid minimum wage and then not permitted to work more than 
 
136 Schils supra n. 122. 
137 See For Example the Survey conducted by Australian Recruiters and reported Australian CPA April 
2000 
http://www.cpaaustralia.com.au/03_publications/02_aust_cpa_magazine/2000/16_apr/3_2_16_13_news.as
p See for example, the Thompson HR Report Issue 295, April 2003, “Managers Cause Workplace Stress,” 
6, http://www.cpd.com.au/cpdnews/hrreport/Archive/HR295.htm.   
138 This difficulty of humans working to machine driven rates and rhythms has been recognized as a 
problem in assembly line labour but appears not to be recognized when it comes to working with 
computers.  The exception is among fighter plane pilots whose human cognitive ability is at times 
insufficient to deal with the complexities of computer flown aircraft resulting in air crashes. See for 
example, study “Optimized Visual Interfaces for Combat Pilots,”  by David Bookstaber, fomer USAF pilot 
and Electronic Systems Center Scientist http://bookstaber.com/david/opinion/PilotInterfaces.pdf
139 Id. 
140 Carol Zabin et al, “The Hidden Public Costs of Law-wage Jobs in California” Prepared for The National 
Economic Development and Law Center, May 2004 
http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/livingwage/workingpoor.pdf
141 Zabin, id.  Wal-Mart has issued a response to the study denying the validity of Zabin et al’s study, 
Contra Costa Times, August 3, 2004. The authors of the study reply to those criticisms, indicating among 
other things where Wal-Mart’s statement is “in complete contradiction with facts.” Arindrajit Dube and 
Ken Jacobs,  Hidden Cost of Wal-Mart Jobs Response to Wal-Mart’s Statements, August 3, 2004 at 1.   
Interestingly, Wal-Mart claims that the employment figure used by the study’s authors (44,000) is incorrect 
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28 hours per week.142 This cap on hours worked permits Wal-Mart to avoid costs such as 
health insurance it may otherwise be forced to incur.  Obviously, the employees are not 
earning sufficient wages to live.143 Under-paying employees has a number of 
consequences.  Whereas prior to the arrival of the big box store, competing employers 
used to pay a living-wage, once big-box stores arrive, smaller employers can no longer do 
so as they are driven to cut costs or go out of business altogether.144 Wal-Mart’s size and 
correlated impact on the labour market wages are driven down throughout the area, as 
small businesses close and their better paying jobs are lost.145 
Further, because of low wages Wal-Mart employees must look elsewhere for 
supplemental income.  Such supplemental income can come from the state,146 other part-
time jobs, the underground economy, or illegal activities.  These activities in turn have 
the further consequences of additional stress, and less time to spend engaging in other 
non-income generating activities “psychic income” that reduce stress and make life 
 
and actually should be 60,500.  if this is the case, the actual cost is $118.2 million. 
http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/lowwage/walmart_response.pdf
142 Rausch supra n 125. 
143 This is one of the main points of Zabin et al’s research, supra n. 140.  Based on detailed payroll data 
Wal-Mart provided in the course of a sex discrimination lawsuit, we found that its average wages were 
$9.70/hr in 2001, and that 54% earned under $9/hr…. We found a 31% wage penalty for working at Wal-
Mart.  Rausch calculates that the average employee earns $8.23 per hour but earns only $13,861 per annum 
because of corporate policy, supra n 115.  Holhut states “”Nearly half of its ‘associates’… make less than 
$15,300- what the federal government considers the poverty level for a family of three. It also controls how 
many of its associates achieve full-time status” supra n. 118. This later observation, of course, is simply a 
management decision concerning the costs of full-time staff and the needs of the corporation in terms of 
staffing.  Where the corporation can provide better profits to the shareholders by keeping full-time staff to a 
minimum and so avoid paying benefits and increased wages, it may well be argued that management has a 
duty to do so.  Wal-Mart employees are required to wait for 6 to 24 months before being able to buy health 
insurance.  In recognition of the fact that it is not paying a living wage, in California it provides direct 
access to community social workers to provide such goods as food stamps, health insurance and other state-
funded assistance.  Holhut, supra n. 118.  Traditionally, small business has provided these goods to 
employees. Shil, at 94.  For an interesting account of this issue in the USA SEE BARBARA EHRENREICH 
NICKEL AND DIMED—ON (NOT) GETTING BY IN AMERICA (2001) 
144 Holhut observes the recent fight by food union workers in the state of California against Wal-Mart 
which in comparison was paying its employees one half of what they unionized workers were earning. 
Supra n. 118. 
145 This point is clarified in the response of Dube and Jacobs, supra note 141, where the authors point out 
that rather than creating new jobs, “The reality is that Wal-Mart jobs primarily substitute for other retail 
jobs – many that pay substantially higher.” At 3.  (Italics in original).   They continue “Allowing for such 
small net losses or gains in jobs would not meaningfully alter the estimates of public costs – which is 
driven primarily by the fact that Wal-Mart pays about 30% less in wages than large retailers overall, and 
23% fewer Wal-Mart workers are covered by job-based health insurance.” 
146 Wal-Mart in California provides a hotline to the local welfare office for employees. Id. 
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enjoyable and worthwhile.  This situation is exacerbated by Wal-Mart’s refusal to pay for 
certain over-time activities which refusal has formed the basis for a class-action against it 
by some 65,000 employees.147 
Wal-Mart’s equity decisions also seem suspect.  For example, while 72% of its workforce 
is female, only 33% of its management are female.  Currently, it is subject to a class-
action lawsuit on behalf of 1.5 million female former employees for sex 
discrimination.148 
Furthermore, Wal-Mart has taken a defiantly anti-union stance.  It maintains an active 
anti-union response team of 70 people ready to descend on any Wal-Mart where 
employees are considering unionizing.149 It attempts to inoculate employees against 
unions by threats150 rather than by providing competitive benefits.  By way of contrast, a 
successful anti-union strategy which worked for various Japanese auto manufacturers has 
been to provide competitive pay and compensation packages.  The result for these 
employers has been to make them the employer of choice for many workers. 
 
Wal-Mart employee dissatisfaction is high.  This fact is evidenced by an employee 
turnover estimated at 44% per year.151 Such dislocations have a high social cost.152 
When people lose employment, even when it is low paying, they lose a sense of security, 
 
147 Wal-Mart employees are required to participate in some activities before the stores open etc. which are 
unpaid.  Wal-Mart is currently subject to more than 40 lawsuits in the USA on the issue of unpaid over-
time work.  Rausch supra n. 125.   Details are available on one of the attorney’s websites.  See 
http://www.lieffcabraser.com/walmart%20lawsuit.htm See also, “Wal-Mart faces class-action over off-the-
clock work” 6 November, 2003 USA TODAY 
148 Id. The action was certified as a class action, a significant step in class-action lawsuits which recognizes 
a cause of action.  The certification was made by Judge Jenkins on June 21, 2004. For a copy of the 
certification order see http://64.81.247.237/staticdata/walmartclass/classcert.pdf For information on the 
case, see the class-action web site dedicated to the case at 
http://www.walmartclass.com/walmartclass94.pl?wsi=0&websys_screen=walmartclass_casedevelopments 
149 Id. 
150 Holhut observes “Wal-Mart is resolutely anti-union and has perhaps the most aggressive union-busting 
operation of any major U.S. corporation.”  Supra n. 118. 
151 Id.  
152 See, for example, discussion in Booth, A. and Zoega, G. “Quitting Externalities, Employment 
Cyclicality and Firing Costs.” CEPR Discussion Paper no. 1101. London, Centre for Economic Policy 
1994.Research. http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP1101.asp 
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and stability.153 The loss of a job undermines one’s sense of well being and dramatically 
increases stress, depression and related socially damaging behaviours including excessive 
alcohol consumption and gambling as people attempt to deal with stress.  These costs are 
passed on into their close communities of friends and family.154 
In summary, Wal-Mart’s low wage policy drives down prices in the labour market.  It off 
loads its operating costs onto the state and other businesses. It damages the well-being of 
employees by eliminating opportunity to access psychic income generating activities, and 
increasing stress resulting from employee turn-over.  Further, its equity and over-time 
policies, and anti-unionism are manifestly opposed to the well-being of its labour force. 
 
d) Democracy 
Wal-Mart harms democracy by unduly influencing the political process needed to get 
development permissions, by funding promotional school materials, by controlling which 
reading materials and products get supplied to consumers,155 by anti-competitive 
pricing,156 by its anti-unionism (discussed above) and by misusing tax-payer largess 
intended to assist local communities stay alive and keep their economies thriving.157 A
153 M. A Dew, L. Penkower, & E.J. Bromet, “Effects of unemployment on mental health in the 
contemporary family.” BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION, 15(4), 501-544 (1991), Canadian Mental Health 
Association Newfoundland and Labrador Division Coping with Unemployment. (2002)..  
http://www.infonet.st-johns.nf.ca/cmha/resource/publications/gcwu/cwu.html L. E. Waters, & K. A. 
Moore, “Coping with economic deprivation during unemployment.” 22 J. OF ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY,, 
461-482 (2001). 
154 P. Voydanoff, “Unemployment: Family, strategies for adaptation.” IN C. R. FIGLEY & H. I. MCCUBBIN 
EDS., STRESS AND THE FAMILY, II-COPING WITH CATASTROPHE (1983). 90-102.  L. Jones, “Unemployment 
and child abuse.” 71(10), FAMILY IN SOCIETY, 579-588 (1990). 
155 Holhut notes Wal-Mart controls 15% of the market for magazines and books.  Supra, n. 118.  
156 Anti-competitive pricing is selling goods for less than competitors at prices which may cause a loss for 
the purpose of driving a competitor out of business. After the competitor is gone, the prices are usually 
raised to even higher levels.  Wal-Mart has engaged in these activities.  See litigation under the Robinson-
Patman Act and discussed on www.lawmall.com
157 Referred to in the literature as “corporate welfare.” See for example, Ches Baragwanath, & John Howe 
“Corporate Welfare Public Accountability for Industry Assistance” Centre for Employment and Labour 
Relations University of Melbourne Discussion Paper Number October 2000 
http://www.tai.org.au/Publications_Files/DP_Files/DP34SUM.PDF A study documenting Wal-Mart’s 
receipt of these funds see Philip Mattera, Anna Purinton, Jeff McCourt, Doug Hoffer, Stephanie 
Greenwood & Alyssa Talanker “Shopping for Subsidies: How Wal-Mart Uses Taxpayer Money to Finance 
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major research study released in May 2004 was able to document receipt by Wal-Mart 
“[of] more than $1 billion in such subsidies from state and local governments to Wal-
Mart; the actual total is certainly far higher.”158 These subsidies were designed to 
promote new businesses in communities for the purposes of benefiting the community.   
The main subsidies the researchers were able to document are: free or reduced-price land, 
infrastructure assistance, tax increment financing, property tax breaks, state corporate 
income tax credits, sales tax rebates, enterprise zone (and other zone) status, job training 
and worker recruitment funds, tax-exempt bond financing, and general grants.159 
Together these activities undermine a community’s ability to organize itself to pursue its 
best interest.  This set of activities is particularly pernicious as the community’s opponent 
is a powerful organization quite able to organize itself and keep its consumers community 
in the dark without good information for the purposes of its own, self interested profit 
motive.  
 
Despite all its ubiquitous statements to the contrary, consumer interests are not the 
ultimate concern.  Clearly, corporate profit is.  Where an entity absorbs such wealth and 
power, it works not only to maintain but to increase its position.  This tendency is a 
phenomenon identified by economists in the economic realm as an effort to control a 
market by means of monopoly.  Wal-Mart is open about its intentions to continue its 
growth (noted above). 
 
its Never-Ending Growth.” May 2004 Good Jobs First, Washington, DC 
http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/pdf/wmtstudy.pdf
158 Mattera et al, id, in the executive summary that their research “documents more than $1 billion in such 
subsidies from state and local governments to Wal-Mart; the actual total is certainly far higher, but the 
records are scattered in thousands of places and many subsidies are undisclosed.”  The same $1 billion 
figure is offered by Barbara Ehrenreich, “Wal-Mars Invades Earth” NY TIMES July 25, 2004. 
159 Mattera id. 
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Further, Wal-Mart reduces expression by its dominance of the market.  Consumers are 
free to choose whatever they like, provided Wal-Mart has agreed to provide it.  This 
restriction of consumer options harkens back to Henry Ford’s comment: “They can have 
any colour they like so long as it is black.” 
 
Wal-Mart has launched an attack on diversity of opinions—which form the basis of 
democracy—by the restrictions it places on authors and artists who wish their goods to be 
distributed as widely as possible, and given Wal-Mart’s dominance as a distributor, such 
wide distribution would include being sold in Wal-Mart stores.  This aspect of the 
problem of democracy is dealt with in greater detail in the next subsection. 
 
e) Cultural Control 
Wal-Mart, because of its buying power, and buying practices as demonstrated above, can 
and does dictate to its suppliers.  It does so as well with respect to its consumers—it seeks 
only those products which it can sell in vast quantities—literature without depth but 
much popular appeal and movies and other entertainments with the same qualities.  Based 
in Bentonville, Arkansas, a conservative backwater of the Southern USA,160 it is a 
product of a conservative world-view.  This background continues to inform its buying 
decisions and what it will permit consumers to purchase at its outlets.  It has refused 
products which have a particular level of sexuality.  For example, Wal-Mart has refused 
to print photos taken by consumers where the subject of the photo has been nude, and 
further, refuses to stock certain contraceptives. 161 Further, it has insisted music lyrics be 
changed or simply refused to place the product.162 It refuses to stock magazines such as 
Maxim, In Style and Sports Illustrated Swimsuit163 and hides the magazine covers of 
Glamor, Cosmopolitan and Redbook.164 Essentially, this is the fear in all democracies: 
 
160 Supra n. 106. 
161 Bianco et al, note Wal-Mart’s refusal to stock Preven, a morning after pill on the basis that it does not 
want to subject its pharmacists to the moral dilemma of dispensing abortion pills.  Supra n. 125. 
162 Bianco et al supra n. 125. Also discussed in more detail by anti-Wal-Mart activist, Al Norman.  See 
story at http://www.netaxs.com/~adredd/normantext.html
163 “Wal-Mart banishes bawdy mags; Retailer takes Maxim, Stuff and FHM off the shelves, citing 
complaints over racy contents.” May 6, 2003  CNN Money 
http://money.cnn.com/2003/05/06/news/companies/walmart_mags/ 
164 Bianco, et al supra n. 125. notes this, quoting Wal-Mart general merchandise manager, Gary Stevens, 
“There’s a line between provocative and pornographic.  I don’t know exactly where it is.”  The statement is 
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that the tyranny of the majority will suppress the views of the minority—in this case, the 
fear of the minority who control Wal-Mart that the majority may oppose the political 
agenda they wish to advance through Wal-Mart.165 
f) Foreign, “outsourced” social costs 
A broader perspective includes the activities of manufacturers who supply Wal-Mart with 
the goods it desires to sell.  In order to produce cheap goods, manufacturers must use the 
cheapest methods.  Basic economic theory suggests that one can substitute inputs and still 
obtain the same outputs or goods desired. So, for example, if a manufacturer wishes to 
produce good A, it can pay X amount of capital plus Y amount of labour to produce n
quantity of goods.  Alternatively, it can manufacture n amount of good A with X+1 in 
capital and a corresponding decrease in labour of Y-1. 
In China, where Wal-Mart purchased $12 billion of its goods for the USA market,166 the 
cost of labour at its factory suppliers is $0.13 per hour.167 Workers must work 13-16 
hours per day, seven days per week.168 The working conditions are described as 
“sweatshops” and those working to provide Wal-Mart with its low cost goods are forced 
to work in conditions that consistently are rated among the worst.169 The argument that 
these conditions are an improvement over unemployment are ingenuous170 as it is not 
 
reminiscent of Justice Potter Stewart, of U.S. Supreme Court who famously stated: “I shall not today 
attempt further to define pornography…but I know it when I see it.”, Jacobellis vs. Ohio, 1964.  while 
clearly the justice was struggling to define the issue for the good of the American public, in the early 
1960’s with the information provided by a bevy of lawyers and specialists, it seems odd that a 
merchandiser seems to think it his role presumably with nothing more than his parochial wisdom informing 
him as to what the public should be exposed to.  The exclusion seems to include various political and social 
commentaries, such as those found in the arts, as noted by the Dead Kennedys, a punk band. 
165 No research was conducted for this study to determine whether Wal-Mart’s cultural control has 
extended to restrict the literature accepted for sale Wal-Mart stores reflects a particular political party.   
166 Fishman supra n. 114. 
167 Rausch supra n. 125. 
168 Id. 
169 Charles Kernaghan, Director of National Labor Committee, and NGO that monitors sweatshops.  Cited 
in Rausch.  A different perspective on the value of such jobs in third world economies is offered by Eugene 
B. Mihaly “Multinational Companies And Wages In Low-Income Countries” 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS.
L. 1 (1999). 
170 The position in favour of trickle down economics in developing economies is well argued, in Mihaly id, 
Stiglitz, indicates that the argument for trickle economics has lost credibility. Supra n. 3.  The failure of 
trickle down economics to work even in the country most friendly to the notion, the USA, has formed the 
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clear that unemployment is the only alternative, nor that local businesses and the local 
economy and environment would not be better off investing in itself and providing 
products for local consumption.171 
Further, in order to keep production costs low, a manager must look for every means 
possible for externalizing costs.  One way of doing so is by not treating wastes properly 
before discharge or simply dumping them directly without any treatment whatsoever.172 
While these costs are passed on to the local and national communities in developing 
countries where the manufacturing is done,173 the benefit is passed on to the American 
consumer who receives under-priced goods.  These factories are using the oldest 
technologies in order to take advantage of the cheaper labour inputs in producing low 
cost goods that they must produce in order to keep Wal-Mart as a customer.  
 
It is truly a no win situation.  To not produce is to not have money in the economy 
necessary to live but to have a habitable, clean environment.  To produce, however, 
requires incurring great social costs.  Further, because of market power, the vast majority 
of the economic benefits of trade are passed on to the USA while the majority of the costs 
and great damage of which stay with the people and the environment of the developing 
nation.   
 
A secondary set of externalities arises from this trade.  While at one time, economists 
insisted that trade benefited all of society, the rising tide theory—a rising tide raises all 
ships and hence, all people in a growing economy will benefit—is no longer the received 
wisdom.174 As Professor G. Kent put it, “The rising tide of trade supposedly will lift all 
ships. But it may be that instead, as the critics suggest, it lifts only yachts, and swamps 
 
basis for a proposition that every American be given USD$80,000.  BRUCE ACKERMAN AND ANNE 
ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (1999), 3-5. 
171 Observed by STIGLITZ id. 
172 Scott Holwick, “Transnational Corporate Behavior and Its Disparate and Unjust Effects on the 
Indigenous Cultures and the Environment of Developing Nations: Jota v. Texaco, a Case Study”
11COLORADO J. OF  INTER’L LAW AND PO.., 183-221 (2000).  This off-loading of pollution is denied by 
free trade advocates. 
173 Wal-Mart purchased $12 billion of its goods in China in 2003. Supra n. 115 
174 Sheldon Danziger & Peter Gottschalk, Do Rising Tides Lift All Boats? The Impact of Secular and 
Cyclical Changes on Poverty, 76 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 405 (1986). 
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vessels that are leaky and decrepit.”175 This consideration is important in two respects.  
First, by diverting resources to production for export, local markets are disrupted and new 
pressures are put on participants (including local villagers and local vendors) in that 
market.  These pressures are largely uncompensated as the participants in those markets 
are not benefited much by trade.  By way of contrast, those controlling production for 
export may be benefiting dramatically.  This fact leads to the second consideration.  
Trade for export may increase significantly inequities in a local economy exacerbating 
per-existing tensions and further up-setting community orderings. While the discussion 
here is not a defence of the status quo, where such changes occur, at times a gradual 
approach may be less disruptive as communities have time to adapt.  
 
Another social cost down-loaded on foreigners results not from the production impacts, 
but from the demand side, the retailing model.  The social costs identified as USA bound 
in this article will likely occur but as amplified by the conditions found in the foreign 
context.  For example, Wal-Mart’s damage will hit countries like Japan hard.  Japan’s 
commercial sector is predominantly made up of small retailers.176 Where Wal-Mart 
enters a market like the Japanese, severe dislocations of small retailers and the related 
social disruption should be anticipated.  Again, the benefit of the foreign subsidiaries is 
directed to the USA parent,177 leaving the disruption outward in the foreign context and 
the benefit inward in to the USA investors.178 
It should not be considered that Wal-Mart will alter its business strategy as a result of 
these social costs to foreigners. Wal-Mart’s market saturation in the USA, has led it to 
 
175 George Kent “Food Trade and Food Rights” (2001) 3 UN Chronicle On-line Edition, 
http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2002/issue1/0102p27.html
176 58% of retailers are small, family owned businesses. Wal-Mart's Foray Into Japan Spurs A Retail 
Upheaval; As Giant Confronts Barriers, Local Competitors Rush To Emulate Its Methods; Balking at the 
'10 Foot' Rule Sept. 19, 2003 NY TIMES.
177 That the parent – subsidiary relation is established to benefit the parent corporation should be 
uncontroversial. 
178 This comment is not that non-USA investors are not benefiting from the profits of Wal-Mart.  Rather, 
that the majority of investors are USA institutional investors, whose clients are largely USA based 
corporations and other citizens. 
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plan to continue its strategy in other markets.179 Thus it should be anticipated that these 
social costs will continue to be imposed on countries outside the USA.   
 
In sum, the production of goods demanded by Wal-Mart forces overproduction with 
maximum social costs in poorer countries.  This overproduction causes considerable 
environmental harm, social dislocation, sweatshops, and disruption in local market 
conditions.  Further, the greater part of the benefit goes to the few wealthy in control of 
the production process and the USA consumer.  The cost goes to the foreign country and 
the majority of its people.  
 
g) Consumerism 
Wal-Mart’s approach of increasing by supplying goods in large or bulk size creates its 
own special set of problems.  For example, Wal-Mart decided to use pickles to create an 
impression of incredibly cheap prices.180 It pressured a supplier of high quality pickles—
if you don’t want to do this, we won’t be able to do business with you any longer—to 
produce gallon181 jars of pickles for less than $3.  The net result was a dramatic increase 
in sales at very low margins, increased demand on farmers and all pickle producers, 
undermining its high quality pickle market it had built up over the years, and eventually 
contributing to the supplier’s bankruptcy.  Perhaps worst of all, as an executive at the 
former pickle supplier observed: “They’d eat a quarter of a jar and throw the thing away 
when they got mouldy.  A family just can’t eat them fast enough.”182 
This problem—promoting over-consumption in a world of limited resources, currently 
reeling under the environmental costs of its consumption habits—is nothing short of 
moronic.  Americans are the most over-weight people on the planet, spend more money 
per capita on diets, consume more goods per capita than anyone else on the planet, and 
Wal-Mart’s strategy, effectively, is to promote further over-consumption by under-
pricing more goods. Basic economic theory indicates that when goods are under priced 
 
179 Bianco supra n. 125.  
180 Story from Fishman, supra n. 114. 
181 Just under 4 litres. 
182 Fishman supra n. 114. 
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they are over consumed.  We need look no further than Wal-Mart to see the truth of this 
principle.  While Wal-Mart is not the creator of consumerism,183 its dominance creates a 
large responsibility to inform consumers about the real costs.  By under-pricing, Wal-
Mart is misinforming the consumer encouraging over-consumption, and to do so in the 
planet’s current state is nothing less than perverse.184 Because of its market dominance, a 
strong argument can be made for it bearing considerable corporate responsibility to 
inform consumers about costs by pricing correctly. 
 
h) Environmental Costs 
The environmental costs imposed by Wal-Mart’s model, alluded to above with respect to 
developing nations, are vast both abroad and in the USA.185 Indeed they are certainly so 
extensive as to beyond the scope of this particular study.  Therefore, only a single 
example will be examined.  Consider, for example, the matters of packaging and 
transport.  Wal-Mart requires extensive packaging of goods.  Each individual item must 
be packaged, and wrapped, placed in boxes, placed on pallets each of which in turn are 
wrapped, shipped locally first and then often from overseas.  Almost all packaging is 
discarded immediately by the consumer as it is largely without benefit, it is often made of 
plastics which are in turn made of limited and highly polluting petro-chemicals which 
 
183 Thinking about this can be traced at least as far back as economist Thorstein Vebelen who noted the 
efforts of the poor to imitate the consumption patterns of the rich.  See David Korten, When Corporations 
Rule the World, 2nd ed. (2000) discussion on the creation of consumerism in Western culture.  See also, 
STEVEN MILES, CONSUMERISM: A WAY OF LIFE (1998), and MATTHEW HILTON, CONSUMERISM IN 
TWENTIETH-CENTURY BRITAIN: THE SEARCH FOR A HISTORICAL MOVEMENT (2003).  The idea that equates 
consumption with happiness comes from economic theory.  The principle of unlimited growth being 
desirable from an economic perspective see discussion in Kysar, supra n. 2, 29-32. See discussion in 
Wolfenden, “Homo economicus: Fantastic fact or factual fantasy?” 1(2) ETHOS-A JOURNAL OF GLOBAL 
ETHICS. (1998)   The dominance of economic discourse in public policy is becoming a common complaint. 
See, for example, Kysar, id. 66 and references therein. 
184 See discussion of ecological economics, which is an effort to integrate the seemly obvious fact of  
limited planetary resources with economic theory, and the challenges faced in both that project and law and 
economics, in Kysar, n. 2. 
185 Consider, for example, the recently settled lawsuit United States of America v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 
Western Builders Inc. et al, filed in the Western District of Arkansas Fayetteville Division.  While this 
externality has been caught by the Environmental Protection Agency and settled by a payment of a $1.0 
million fine as is accepted in regulatory law there are certainly many others not being caught.  In this 
instance, the infraction resulted from Wal-Mart’s failure to monitor its contractors in the construction of 
new stores.  It is interesting to note that Plaintiff alleges in paragraph 8 of the complaint that Wal-Mart is 
opening between 100 and 200 new stores annually.  Of the 17 infractions in the complaint, 9 give 
approximate sizes of the development.  The average size of the development is 22 acres.  If calculated at 
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require the use of other toxic chemicals which have their own environmental and human 
health costs.  The costs for the manufacture of packaging is openly acknowledged not to 
include the true costs.186 
Further, it can hardly be argued that the actual environmental costs of burning fossil 
fuels—creating greenhouse gases—for the transport over land is factored into the 
transportation costs of goods to market.  Greenhouse gases already are costing hundreds 
of billions of dollars and are increasing exponentially.187 Further, sea-going cargo is 
shipped on container vessels that burn the dirtiest fuel produced by refineries.  An 
average vessel produces emissions that are equivalent to 350,000 automobiles.188 These 
environmental costs are not factored into the costs simply because they are not charged to 
the vessel operators.  The world’s container fleet has increased five fold over the last 
twenty years with no world body effectively addressing these issues.189 Of course, 
because the analysis in this study has been focused on Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. as a retail 
sales corporation, the vast majority of issues related to the manufacture, over-
consumption, and disposal of consumed goods has not been addressed. 
 
i) Wal-Mart’s Position 
Wal-Mart is not blind to criticism of social costs or the idea of the good corporate citizen.  
As it states on its website: 
 
the minimum of 100 stores, Wal-Mart’s expansion amounts to 2,200 acres per year.   
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/cwa/walmart.html
186 Even the simple disposal problem associated with packaging has not been adequately resolved, let alone 
the pollution caused in its production.  Efforts to deal with this are most advanced in the EU with its 
Producer Responsibility legislation. Directive 85/339/EEC.  Updated report Commission Of The European 
Communities, “Proposal For A Directive Of The European Parliament And Of The Council amending 
Directive 94/62/EC on packaging and packaging waste.” Brussels, 07.12.2001, COM(2001) 729 final, 
2001/0291 (COD) available at  http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/pdf/2001/com2001_0729en01.pdf
187 These costs are the reason that the insurance industry has begun lobbying for action against global 
warming.  Sharon Beder notes that Reinsurers Association of America claims “insurers paid $57 billion for 
weather-related losses in the first half of the 1990s compared with $17 billion for the whole of the previous 
decade. Sharon Beder, 'Insurers Sweat Over Global Warming', (August 2001) Engineers Australia, 41. 
188 Russell Long “Where There's Smoke, There's Pollution,” February 21, 2004, NEW YORK TIMES.
189 The International Maritime Organization, the UN’s body for marine environmental pollution has yet to 
consider emissions as a treaty item.  Its problems in creating treaties that are effective in controlling marine 
environment pollution are great.  See discussion in Benedict Sheehy, “Does International Marine 
Environment Law Work? An Examination of the Cartagena Convention for The Wider Caribbean Region.” 
(Forthcoming) 12(3) GEORGETOWN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW.
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Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. believes each Wal-Mart store, SAM'S CLUB and 
distribution center has a responsibility to contribute to the well being of the local 
community. Our more than 3,400 locations contributed more than $150 million to 
support communities and local non-profit organizations.190 
It goes on to describe how the funds are allocated and various recognitions it has received 
for its contributions.  Do these contributions fulfill its social responsibility, or compensate 
fully the community for social costs?  Lee Scott, the President and CEO offers “Wal-
Mart paid $4 billion in U.S. federal income taxes in fiscal year 2004” which he sees as 
another measure of the corporation’s contribution to society.191 But it is difficult to see 
why avoiding criminal sanctions for not paying taxes should be seen as contributing to 
society.  Further, it must be remembered that the tax bill is the absolute minimum that the 
corporation could be forced to pay, having been prepared by the most competent and 
aggressive tax specialists Wal-Mart could buy. 
 
Business ethicists, who see corporate activity as falling into their domain, note six areas 
which can be considered as corporate social costs.  They note the effect on the 
community, representation of minorities and women, how corporations treat their 
employees, environmental protection, foreign stakeholders, and customers.192 
Interestingly, in the last five years that Business Ethics Magazine has been auditing and 
compiling lists, Wal-Mart despite being the number one corporation in the world in terms 
of size, it has never been listed among the 100 most ethical corporations even in the USA. 
In other words, it has not matched its size achievement in terms of internalizing its 





191 “It’s my Wal-Mart” 2004 Annual Report. 
192 See www.business-ethics.com
193 “100 Best Corporate Citizens,” BUSINESS ETHICS MAGAZINE, 2004. For an interesting recent 
development, see the International Standards Organization’s initial work on corporate Social 
Responsibility. Working Report on Social Responsibility, April 30, 2004. 
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All of the forgoing leads to the question of the causes or nature of the problem.  Clearly, 
one cause is the information asymmetry.  As noted above, in the pickle sales example, the 
goods were being sold at a price that was “incredible.”  It is incredible: literally it is not 
credible to sell goods at that price, because as we have seen, the actual price is 
considerably higher.  Quite simply, the price did not factor in all the costs.  The 
information was not passed on to the people.  Where people have the information, there is 
evidence to suggest that people prefer not to have those consequences.194 
Another aspect to the problem is the focus on wealth creation and in particular, profit 
making.  Where profit is the sole objective, other abilities, such as broader community 
cooperation is diminished or lost.  
 
7) CORPORATE VEHICLE AND SOCIAL COSTS 
 
Wal-Mart is not culpable in either business terms, nor except as identified in the actual, 
pending and potential lawsuits, in legal terms.195 Further, it is a darling of the stock 
market.196 The question is whether this matter of social costs is a problem resulting from 
the corporate form or merely a matter unique to the mega-retail discount giants?  If it is 
the latter, then it is simply matter of regulation concerning the size of retailers.  If it is the 
former, it requires further consideration and analysis. 
 
The corporation’s role in this situation is not self-evident.  If one accepts the corporation 




194 There is a considerable consumer and social lobby against Wal-Mart because of the damage it causes to 
society.  This consumer reaction and the damage caused to communities by Wal-Mart is noted by Stiglitz, 
supra, n. 3, 68.  See for example, anti-trust lawyer, A. Person’s website, and Al Norman’s work. Further 
work is being done in Australia as the damage of big-boxes is becoming known.  A search of google.com 
produced 1,690 hits for “stop Wal-Mart.”  No activist groups attempting to bring Wal-Mart to localities 
were found but many opposing it.  On the law and economics perspective of the consumer-merchant 
information  asymmetry and views of regulatory intervention, see Bailey Kuklin “Self-Paternalism in the 
Marketplace” 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 649 (1992). 
195 Concerns about the legality of its monopolist business strategies and anti-union activities are noted by 
U.S.A. lawyer, A. Person on his website www.lawmall.com
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around the world, simply claiming as Easterbrook and Fischel would have it, that it was 
all voluntary and therefore not in need of any regulation.197 If one chooses, however, to 
acknowledge the reality of the widely disseminated detriment caused to the socio-
economic landscapes in the developed nations and in the third world, which additionally 
bears the social costs—namely, the harsh reality faced by the workers in the sweatshops 
and the environmental damage created, one can see a very significant role caused by 
corporations.  
 
The corporate structure serves as a vehicle for raising funds and coordinating production.  
By shielding its participants, investors, directors and other controllers alike from the 
consequences of their actions—in this case, their social costs—the corporation makes it 
much easier to engage in activities that on a personal level one would find 
unacceptable.198 
The corporate form permits and encourages the concentration of wealth and power—in 
Easterbrook and Fischel’s terms: “[it is] the firm’s strength (its tendency to maximize 
wealth).”199 It enables corporate controllers and investors to exploit the weaknesses of 
the market for their own advantage, as Easterbrook and Fischel implicitly acknowledge in 
their statement: “The task is to establish property rights so that the firm treats the social 
costs as private ones, and so that its reactions, as managers try to maximize profits given 
these new costs.”200 The weaknesses of the market susceptible to exploitation are those 
market failures, noted above, information asymmetry and externalities, which permit the 
corporation to benefit without being able to force the corporation to bear the costs. By 
creating an entity that is focused exclusively on finance and wealth generation without 
concern for the other consequences of its activities, law has created an entity that will 
maximize its use of externalities for which it has no liability, in order to maximize its 
 
196 On a scale of 1-5, with 1 being a strong buy recommendation, a sampling of analysts give it a 2. See 
analysis on Yahoo Finance pages. http://finance.yahoo.com/q/ao?s=WMT
197 Although society does not condone, or law permit all voluntary transactions.  This is the concept of 
inalienability in Calabresi & Melamed’s theory of property.  
198 This is the problem of role specific ethics and discussed in the ethics literature surrounding corporate 
failures and white collar crime. 
199 Supra n. 90 at 30. 
200 Id at 39. 
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internal profits and wealth creation.  In the Wal-Mart case study, the strategy of 
employing the greatest number of part-time employees without benefits, anti-unionism, 
imposition of social costs on China all work to increase profits.  These strategies are 
implementations of the incentive scheme facilitated by the corporate form.  
 
The corporation facilitates this minimization or externalizing of costs by offering a legal 
shield to insiders—the beneficiaries of the corporate form—from the true costs of the 
activities from which they intend to profit.  In a worst case scenario from the perspective 
of insiders, a corporate bankruptcy, neither directors nor officers, nor shareholders, nor 
creditors, nor employees will be liable for all the costs created by the corporation where 
the corporation has acted in accordance with the law regardless of the quantity or quality 
of those costs.  In such a worst-case scenario, the corporation acts as a shield and all that 
is lost are its assets and share value.   
 
A worst case scenario from the perspective of outsiders, those bearing the social costs, is 
not by any means a corporate collapse.201 A corporation which continues to operate, 
destroying the environment, poisoning employees, undermining societies is certainly the 
worst.  In other words, the worst case scenario for society is the opposite of a corporate 
collapse-corporate survival. 
 
Furthermore, given the incentive structure in the market, being tied exclusively to profits, 
there is no incentive to internalize any costs.  In what can only be described as a 
perversion of social good, corporate incentives are the exact opposite.  To the extent that 
a director, officer or manager can externalize a cost and so increase profits, there is a 
reward for doing so.  Thus with the combination of a structure providing a shield from 
consequences and an incentive structure for externalizing negative consequences it 
cannot but be supposed that corporations will act in exactly the manner of Wal-Mart.   
 
201 The media attention to corporate collapse cause many to infer that such an event is a worst case 
scenario.  While a large corporate collapse causes disruption to the economy and to the lives of employees 
and suppliers, certainly some of the externalities discussed in this paper are greater concerns.   
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Further, with its power over the market and control of information, the corporation will 
exploit the information asymmetry between it and other market participants.  The 
corporation is not required to disclose much about the majority of its activities, and as 
seen in the case of Wal-Mart, will tend to be intensely secretive about many of its 
activities.202 It does not want competitors to utilize the information to its disadvantage.  
More importantly, the corporate form will continue to facilitate profit making when 
people do not understand the consequences of its activities.  Again, the corporate 
structure and the incentives discussed above are designed to support this approach.  This 
strategy has been employed by big tobacco, automobile manufacturers, and oil 
companies.  It is as if these latter lessons have not been learned by society; instead 
society has accepted continued corporate harm merely instituting a non-smoking 
campaign while corporations increase the toxicity of tobacco, accepting automobiles as 
status symbols instead of transportation while automobile corporations manufacture more 
dangerous and environmentally damaging vehicles (SUV’s, sport Utility Vehicles), and 
accepting increased greenhouse emissions as petroleum corporations join in the 
promotion of increased burning of fossil fuels by supporting vehicle manufacturers 
campaigns for larger vehicles.203 
To address the information asymmetry, some scholars have begun advocating triple 
bottom line accounting.  Whereas the corporate focus on economic results has lead to 
exclusive focus on financial reporting, this approach to accounting requires corporations 
to provide information on social costs not just monetary profits.  While this may well be a 
step in the right direction, unless there is a dramatic reform in the economic structure of 
the corporation tying such measures to profit they are unlikely to have much effect.204 
Furthermore, given the incomplete nature of markets, it will never be possible to account 
for all costs in a market regime.  Accordingly, for those committed to both a market 
economy and accounting for social costs, another mechanism needs to be developed for 
attaching cost to benefit, and deducting the former from the latter for purposes of 
 
202 Fishman supra n. 114. 
203 See the connection between the automobile, petroleum industries and related safety matters in Gregg 
Easterbrook  “The 50-Cent-a-Gallon Solution” 25 May 2004 THE NEW YORK TIMES.
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accurately stating the position of the corporation.  As Coase would say, “choosing… 
arrangements we should have regards for the total effect.”205 Where such an accounting 
has been done, it has led to the conclusion that current economic activity, contrary to the 
supposed benefit indicated by ever increasing GDP figures, is in fact a net loss to life on 
the planet.206 
Another effort to address corporate social costs has been reflected through the Corporate 
Social Responsibility movement.  This movement’s advocates promote triple-bottom line 
accounting, corporate governance and higher levels of personal responsibility.  This 
recommendation of increased liability where property rights are inappropriate or 
ineffective, is in accord with the recommendations of law and economics scholars.207 
One example, of this increased liability, it may be argued is the recent Sarbanes-Oxley 
legislation, which places the onus on corporate insiders to support the figures presented to 
the public, is an effort of just such a sort.  The problem with this approach is one not 
unique to the problem of social costs or corporate law:  it is a problem with law in 
general.  Law tends to be post facto, fixing things after they have gone wrong.  So, where 
a corporate insider chooses to support a false statement, such falsehood may not be 
discovered until it is too late (as in the case of Enron) and the insider has disappeared 
with the profits, or destroyed some aspect of the environment, or created some other 
social cost. 
 
While the benevolent view of the market advocated by Adam Smith may have been 
appropriate for his day of small entrepreneurs and minimal obvious social costs, the 
environmental and social carnage caused by a single corporation like Wal-Mart is beyond 
anything he could have imagined, let alone advocated.208 With our increased 
understanding of the ecology of the planet and the forces in society, it is inappropriate to 
continue to permit corporations with their current structural immunities and perverse 
 
204 Efforts of ethical investment funds or Socially Responsible Investing are an exception, but the size, 
coordination and influence of these institutional investors is not known. 
205 See supra n. 82. 
206 See Kysar, supra, n. 2. 
207 Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View 
of the Cathedral, 1090 HARVARD L. REV., April 1972. 
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incentive structures to destroy the very thing we humans value most: a thriving society in 




Sociologist Sharon Zukin has identified the broad-based negative effect of big-box stores.  
She opines: 
 
I think stores like Wal-Mart are bad for the world… and bad for the local 
communities, because they suck up the buying power without creating the dynamism 
for local economies to grow…. Local economies grow on the basis of new products, 
growth in production, growth in jobs and lots of local merchants.  But with one store 
you just don’t get that.209 
Her view, which summarizes much of the argument in this article, would lead to the 
conclusion that the social costs are overtaking the utility of the neo-classical law and 
economics model of the corporation. 
 
To a certain extent, the issue is a coordination problem—the particular type of problem 
that faces parties when more than a single value is involved.  This type of situation, as 
demonstrated above, is not susceptible to a Coasean analysis.  It requires collective 
action, governmental intervention, and where governments have been co-opted by 
corporations, some type of change in corporate legislation to address the issue.   
 
One aspect or cause of coordination problems are the concerns that parties bring to their 
everyday concerns and work.  As Stiglitz, the former chief economist for the World Bank 
observes: “The typical central bank governor begins his day worrying about inflation 
statistics, not poverty statistics; the trade minister worries about export numbers, not 
pollution indices.”210 In other words, humans tend to focus on the matters under their 
 
208 As Stiglitz observes, Smith himself was aware of market failures. Supra n. 3, 219. 
209 Zukin, supra n. 125. 
210 216. 
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immediate control without worrying or making efforts to coordinate their efforts with 
others.  This natural tendency is particularly worrisome where it effects people at the 
centres of power, such as the governors of central banks failing to coordinate with others 
in similarly located centres of power, let alone ignoring the ecology which sustains 
human life and the economy in the first place. Yet if social costs are not successfully 
addressed because of a failure to resolve the coordination problem, the world will become 
a much more difficult place to inhabit, at least for the human species.  Ironically, the 
corporate structure, which is such a significant creator of social costs, facilitates 
coordination within itself.  It is able to do so because of its single focus on profits and so 
suffers to a much lesser degree the coordination problem.  The corporation’s strength in 
this regard may yet be helpful in solving the problem of social costs where it could be 
turned to that end. 
 
Regardless, these problems of coordination and dramatically increasing social costs, it 
may make sense to look at corporate law reform.  Such reform should follow on our 
experience with business, where corporate directors have been granted power on the basis 
of financial performance, perhaps directorships of the other important social costs should 
be developed.  An empowered, informed, incentived, and accountable director of 
ecology, for example, sitting on the board of directors, or a similarly created directorship 
of labour211 could potentially reduce significantly the related social costs resulting from a 
corporation’s profit making activities. 
 
A law and economics approach provides two directives: normatively, that the social costs 
of the corporate vehicle must be internalized and positively: that rational self-interested 
actors will act only according to their knowledge.  Where that knowledge includes social 
costs, and where the incentive structure is appropriate, a more effective means of 
internalizing externalities and hence minimizing these social costs will lead to 
appropriate pricing.212 Appropriate pricing permits the market to appreciate the costs 
associated with actions and preferences, and so to make better choices concerning the 
 
211 Such as is found in the GmBH in Germany. 
212 Some suggestions are canvassed in my “The Importance of Corporate Models” supra n. 18. 
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allocation and use of the planet’s resources.  This approach to addressing the market 
failure caused by information asymmetry and the corporation’s concerted effort to exploit 
consumer ignorance is certainly not an easy agenda; however, given the consequences of 
failure to address the issues, continuing current practices is simply not an option. 
 
The larger question of this article has been: How well does the Law and Economics 
contractarian model describe the corporate activity and deal with social costs?  Our 
answer is clearly, not well at all.  This suggests further research and the possibility that 
working with a concessionaire model may yet be a more successful manner for 
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